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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation :

A Study of the Application of Utmost Good Faith
Principle under the English Marine Insurance
Law : Legal Review and Practical Solutions

Degree :

MSc

This dissertation analyses the application of the utmost good faith principle under the
English marine insurance law and its implication to the benefits of the assured. English
marine policy has been used by the assured internationally. An UNCTAD report (1982)
said that approximately two thirds of the countries in the world utilizing hull or cargo
insurance use the British conditions solely. However, one should aware of a principle of
utmost good faith in the English marine policy, because the assured will loss his cover if
he breaches it. It seems that principle is being applied mutually, both to the insurer and the
assured. But, actually it is more favourable of the interest of the insurer. The situation is
more unfortunate and unfair to the assured when such principle would apply to the marine
insurance, regardless of the gravity of fault. In addition, the regime only provide a singledraconian remedy, avoidance of the contract. That remedy has retrospective impact legally.
Much criticism regarding the disproportionate of utmost good faith application had been
exposed. But, the will of revision of the good faith issues, in order to make it more flexible
and balance, is less than it hoped. Such reform of the utmost good faith principle, had been
recognised by the other European states, mainly civil law system states and some common
law states, by reforming their laws related to the utmost good faith application. General
notion of the reformation is to provide a fair and balance duty of utmost good faith and
provide flexible of remedy based on the gravity of faults. It has a purpose to obtain a justice
of the case for the benefits of both assured and insurer. However, a promising change of the
good faith issue under the English law, had been obtain from the recent judgement of
insurance case which allowed the assured to exclude the duty of utmost good faith
including the draconian remedy by the inclusion of a specific clause to the insurance
contract. Hoping that it constitutes a promising step taken by the English court in order to
change the application of utmost good faith be proportionate and fair than before.
KEYWORDS : Utmost good faith, unfair and disproportionate, flexibility of other
jurisdictions, change by contractual approach, exclusion clause of duty.

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MIA

Marine Insurance Act 1906

Lloyd´s Rep.

Lloyd´s Law Reports (After 1967)

A.C.

Appeal Case

Lloyd´s Report. IR

Lloyd´s Reports Insurance & Reinsurance

LI.L. Rep.

Lloyd´s Law Reports Insurance & Reinsurance

App. Cas.

Appeal Case

Com. Cas.

Reports of Commercial Cases

All. ER.

All England Law Reports

CA

Court of Appeal

Q.B.D.

Queen´s Bench Division

AP

Additional Premium

ICA

Insurance Contract Act

ix

LIST OF CASES

Agapitos v. Agnew and Others (The “Aegeon”)., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 43 (2002).

Alfred McAlpine v. BAI (Run-off)., 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 437 (C.A.) (2002).
Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. and Another v. Bayley and Others., 1 Lloyd´s Rep 268.
(1969).
Akedian Co Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd, Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1997) 148
ALR 480, 494.
Attwood v. Small.,HL.345,350 (1838).
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The
Good Luck), 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 514 (1989).
Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd., 1, QB. 665,772 (1990).

Becker v. Marshall., 11. LI.L.Rep.114(1922).
Blackburn v. Vigors., 12 App. Cas.531 (1887).
Black King Shipping Corporation and Wayang (Panama) S.A. v. Mark Ranald Massie (Litsion
Pride)., 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 437-438 (1985).

Berger and Light Diffusers Pty. Ltd v. Pollock., 2 Lloyd´s Rep.442 (1973).
Brownile v. Campbell., 5 App. Cas. 925 at p.954(1820).
Carter v. Boehm., 3 Burr (1766).
Container Transport International Inc. (CTI) and Reliance Group Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual
Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 179 (1982).

x

Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Bathurst (The Captain Panagos
DP), 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 625 (1985).

Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas.337 (1990).

Elena., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 378(2001).
Empress Assurance Corporation Ltd v. Bowring & Co. Ltd., 11 Com.Cas.107. (1905).
Galloway v. Guardian Royal Exchange (UK)., Lloyd´s Report. IR.2000 (1999.,).

Glicksman v. Lancashire and General Assurance Company, Ltd., A.C.139;26
LI.L.Rep.69 (1927).
Gracia Express., 2 Lloyd´s Rep.88 (2002).
Hedley Byrne & Co.Ltd v. Hellers & Partner., A.C. 465 (1964).
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others., 2
Lloyd´s Rep.483-484. (2001).

Inversiones Manria S.A. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co.Plc., Malvern Insurance Co.Ltd.,
and Niagara Fire Insurance Co.Inc., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 69 (1989).
Ionides and Another v. Pender., L.R. 9 Q.B.531(1872).
Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company., K.B. 863(1908).
K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v. Certain Lloyd´s Underwriters Subscribing to Lloyd´s Policy No.25
T 105487 and Ocean Marine Insurance Co.Ltd and Others (The “Mercandian Continent)., 2
Lloyd´s Rep. 563 (2001).

Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd., 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 16 (1954).
Lambert V. Cooperative Insurance Society, Ltd.,2 Lloyd´s Rep.485 (1975).

xi

Manifest Shipping Co.Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co.Ltd and La Reunion Europene (The Star
Sea)., 1 Lloyd´s Rep. 389 (2001).

Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Ontario Metal Products Co. Ltd. A.C. 344.
(1925).
Pan Atlantic Insurance Co.Ltd. and Another v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. 1 Lloyd´s
Rep. 497(1993).
PCW Syndicates v. PCW Reinsurers., 1 Lloyd´s Rep.241 (1996).
Roberts V. Plaisted., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 341(1989).
Roselodge.Ltd.(Formerly “Rose” Diamond Products, Ltd) v. Castle., 2 Lloyd´s Rep. 113114 ( 1966 ).
Schoolman v. Hall.,1 Lloyd´s Rep. 139 (1951).

Smith v.Chadwick, HL. 29-,300 (1884).
St. Paul Fire & Insurance Co.Ltd(UK) v. McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd. And Others., 2
Lloyd´s Rep.503 (1993).

White v. Jones., 1 All E.R. 691(1995).
Wolcott v. Excess Insurance., 1 Lloyd´s Rep.633 (1978)

xii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the maritime and related-industry, risks always exist. That is part integrally on the
nature of the business itself. It is widely known that the nature of the maritime industry is
a high-risky business. So why does the role of

risk management has such important

function in order to manage the risk as minimally as possible. In risk management, there
is a branch called the treatment of risk consisting of four aspects : first, avoiding risk;
secondly, controlling by risk reductio n; thirdly, spreading risk by the transfer of risk;
fourth, accepting risk by risk retention (Donner, 2002).

Insurance is an activity of managing a risk falling under the third aspect as a way of
transferring a risk in the business. The insurance method of managing a risk is the
“outsourcing” approach upon which the role of the insurance company will compensate
the assured if the loss or incident occurs prejudicing to the financial condition of an
assured. In the opinion of Donner (2002), insurance neither makes the risk disappear nor
avoids or reduces the risk itself. It is simply the person who effects insurance should be
compensated financially for the loss, returning the assured to the same financial situation
that he would have been in if the loss had not occurred. So then as reward for the insurer
who is deliberately taking over the risk, the assured is obliged to pay the premium agreed.

I. 1. Dominance of the English Marine Policy
In the context of insuring an activity or business, England is a predominant state which
has an established and well-known reputation in the handling of the insurance business.
Specially, the marine insurance activities constitute the are which that state has greater
expertise and it is reflected by the application of the English marine policy in the
international maritime community. According to an UNCTAD report (1982)
approximately two thirds of the countries in the world utilizing hull or cargo insurance
use the British conditions solely, or as an alternative to, or in conjunction with local
policies. When considering only the developing countries, this figure rises to about three
quarters.
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I.2. English Marine Policy : How Do We Analysed it ?
Although, the English marine policy has gained greater recognition in the international
maritime community, the critical question could be still raised by those who want to
effect the insurance cover under the English jurisdiction for a better preventive action, is
it really a safe choice legally to use the English marine policy for the benefits of the
assured ? Because the English marine policy has its own character legally compared to
other policies that one should be aware of, in order to ensure that certainty of
indemnification is relatively secured to the assured. Therefore, in author´s view, the
scope of answer will be limited to certain aspects of the English marine insurance law.
Such certain aspect is about the application of the utmost good faith principle which is
one of the major principles applicable in the English marine insurance law and practice.

I.3. Is It A Safer Choice Legally to Use the English Marine Policy ?
A marine insurance contract is a contract of indemnity which secures the assured from
any consequence of loss or damage in the marine adventure. One of the most important
principle under marine insurance law is the utmost good faith principle. The principle or
duty can be seen from section 17-20 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which stated
that a contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and if
it is not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party. Indeed,
it covers the features of duty to disclose as well as representation upon which the assured
and his insurance broker should comply with.

In addition, the principle of utmost good faith has its own uniqueness which is shown in
its application not only to the marine insurance business, but also to the non-marine
insurance activities, such as property insurance, and fire insurance. The justification of
the broad application of this principle, inter alia, was derived from the judgement of the
Court of Appeal in the case of Lambert v. Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. (1975)
stating that there was no obvious reason why there should be a rule of disclosure in
marine insurance different from the rules in other forms of insurance.
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Obviously, the principle has its origin from the Lord Mansfield (Thomas, 1996, pp.32) in
1766 relating to the judgment of the Carter v. Boehm case which stated that “Insurance is
a contract of speculation. The special facts …….is to be computed lie most commonly in
the knowledge of the assured only; ….. to mislead the underwriter into a belief that the
circumstance does not exist.…. is a fraud, and therefore the policy is void. Although the
suppression should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention, yet still the
underwriter is deceived and the policy is void…….” . In other words, there is no
difference whether the breach of utmost good faith principle is done innocently,
negligently, or fraudulently, the remedy of avoidance of the contract insurance must be
given to either party.

It seems clear that the legal formulation of such principle may be interpreted strictly and
unjustly, and thereby tends to be more favourable to the insurer. Accordingly, those
applicable laws would make the legal position of the insurer stronger than the assured in
each claim dispute settlement. In the light of such situation, up to a certain extent, the
insurer may avoid the marine insurance contract on the basis of undisclosed information,
which is completely disconnected to the causes of the loss or damage (UNCTAD,1982).

Therefore, when the unjust and unfair application of utmost good faith duty has had its
full effect on the person effecting insurance contract in the English jurisdiction, it will
create higher risk of non-indemnity for the simple breach of that principle against the
assured and would result in financial disaster when loss or damage occurs. In that
situation, the use of an English marine policy has put the assured in the high-legal risk
position when he is deemed to breach of that duty.

As such, there have been increasing criticism levelled to the principle; there are some
who believe that it contains opaqueness in its application and unfair treatment to the
assured due to distortion inherent in its aim focused to maintain a balance duty of utmost
good faith between the insurer and the assured. Others claimed that the strict application
of this principle, particularly in terms of draconian remedy of avoiding the contract
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including for a simple breach and or breach which is not related the occurrence of loss,
was too rigid and that was no longer suitable under this modern time.

In respect to the rigidity and unfair application of such principle, it has been justified
precisely when it is compared to the other policies under different jurisdiction of
European states such as Norway, France, Germany which are mainly from the civil law
system or a state from the common law system such as Australia, which at the beginning
of its marine insurance law adopted the similar nature of utmost good faith principle
applicable in English jurisdiction. Those states have taken a different and more flexible
approach legally when they regulate the issue of utmost good faith duty application to
marine insurance. Nevertheless, its rigidity of utmost good faith duty application in the
English marine insurance law has been changing apparently by allowing to exclude the
implementation of utmost good faith duty to the insurance contract by the assured, if the
assured has had specific circumstances which put him in the position of having no
relevant situation to observe the duty.

In light of such situation, this research analyses the existing laws applied in respect of
utmost good faith principle and how the English court applies it in order to settle the case
of breach of the utmost good faith principle. In addition, its development in recent times
will be described from the relevant legal cases, and also how the assured should do
legally with a purpose of obtaining a better position legally in order to protect his
interests when effecting insurance contract in the English jurisdiction. The author assures
that the necessity of the English marine policy changes to be more flexible in terms of
the remedy and provides a fairer situation for the assured, would bring more benefits than
harm for the acceptance of English marine policy in the international market, and with
the hope that the harmonisation of marine insurance policy will come true in order to
make it much easier for the assured to effect insurance contract without so much legal
burden to identify which is a better choice legally for the protection of his interests.

The research is divided into five chapters: Chapter one gives a general description of the
topic; Chapter two explains the theoretical background of utmost good faith duty from
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the perspective of the civil law system as well as common law system including the
English law system, including its legal relationship with the contract and tort law;
Chapter three analyses the application of utmost good faith from the view of s statutory
law as well as court decisions; Chapter four discusses the legal criticism of the difficulties
and uncertainties of the legal approach taken by the English court when settling legal
cases in respect of utmost good faith issues and a recent position taken by the English
court for similar issues; Chapter five provides a conclusion and the legal solutions that
practically could be used by the assured to have a better protection of his interests when
effecting marine insurance contract in the English marine policy.
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CHAPTER II
THE LEGAL THEORY OF GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE

In commercial transaction, the involvement of law must be represented by the agreed
conditions which is freely made by the parties who have an interest in the accomplishing
of the commercial transaction. Such law is commonly called a contract, which might be
written as well as unwritten. However, in this modern time and the fact that the
commercial transaction itself, which mostly is quite a complicated, so that the contract
is strongly recommended to have a contract in a written form. Major benefits of a written
contract are exact and strong legal document that will be used as a valid evidence for the
existence of the commercial transaction, and relatively easy to be proved.

Furthermore, in contract law perspective, one has a freedom of contract. In other words,
when a person has an intention to make a contract, he could make any kind of contract, in
terms of its content and form. However, a freedom of contract is mentioned here not an
absolute freedom, but the limited freedom under the limitations of the fundamental
aspects of law. The basic reason behind such limitations is to secure or maintain the
equity or any other values which are deemed as very essential for the continuity of a
society. The principle of good faith is one limitation created by the law to maintain the
equity between parties involving in a contract. This principle of good faith has a role in
the contract law as well as in the tort law.

II.1. Good Faith Principle under Contract Law
Beatson (2002) as quoted from the Section 1 of the American Law Institute´s
Restatement Second of the Law of Contracts gives the definition of contract is a promise
or set of promise for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognises as a duty. In addition, a contract has several
functions in the commercial transaction. And among those functions, English law
stipulates that the planning function is of paramount importance by its preference for
rules that establish certainty in the commercial transaction. Again, contract law
establishes a mechanism of remedy that is imposed by the contracting party in the context
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of breach of the contractual duties as well as other duties imposed by the law related to
the formation and or performance of contract.

As it has been mentioned above, contract law recognizes the concept of the freedom of
contract, which has a twofold meaning; one related to its positive aspect, namely the
creative power of the participants in the process to act as private legislators and to
legislate rights and duties binding upon themselves. The other meaning was concerned
with what may be termed its negative aspect, namely the freedom from obligation unless
consented to and embodied in a valid contract (Beatson & Friedman, 1994, pp.7-8). The
latter has the implied meaning that there is no liability without the consent stipulated by
the parties in a contract. The result of such freedom of contract doctrine is to make the
control over contractual terms minimum. Thus, it will lead to the anomaly of a contract
which is represented by the establishment of a contract based on the ground of
unreasonableness and or unfairness. Similarly when the contractual justice is talked, it
has a meaning that an equity in a contract is merely to respect or honour the consent of
the parties without considering the contents of the contract itself. In other words, there is
no role for public policy to maintain the public interest in the form of supervising over
the terms of a contract which meets the equity or justice between the parties involved or
not. Or a contract could not be deemed as against public policy, although its content is
clearly harsh or grossly unfair.

The regime of freedom of contract which created a nearly absolute right of parties`
consent in a contract, has classified the contract law into two types: a classical and
modern contract law. Beatson and Friedman (1994, pp. 9-10) that the classical contract
law entails generally several characteristics; namely, the supremacy of the parties`
intention which has described above, the marginal role of judicial discretion over the
contract and the a very minimum pre-contractual duties.

However, in practice, the

classical contract law has its paradoxical situations, which exist in the context of
relationship between the supremacy of parties` consent and the question of certainty of
law in a contract, so that if the parties` consent was not “real”; for example if it was
vitiated by the elements such as mistake, misapprehension or duress, that contract should
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be avoided. Furthermore, under English contract law, the objective theory established a
situation of no matter what parties` real intention is, if he so conducts himself that other
party reasonably believes that he assents to the terms of the contract, he would be bound
as if he actually agreed to them. From the “as if” regime under the objective theory, a
person may be under a binding obligation to which he never consented, simply because
he acted as if he did consent.

On the other hand, the modern contract law contains a different nature which is mainly
characterized from its dominant role to control over the contract. Such control is
implemented through the judicial discretion as well as legislative intervention by
imposing statutory duty to the parties of a contract. This scope of control under the
modern contract regime embraces equity of content in a contract and its contractual
remedies. When looking it from the judicial discretion point of view, the court feels free
to reshape the law and or develop a principle which should be applied to the contract. In
the context of legislative intervention, the introduction of statutory undue influence gives
the right to an injured party to rescind the contract. In addition, the modern contract law
also recognizes the economic duress as vitiating factors to repudiate a contract.
Conclusively, the modern contract law largely to dilute formal requirements and to attach
greater weight to substantive fairness.

II.1.1. The Nature of Good Faith
The principle of good faith is a public policy interest which was established from the
perspective of modern contract law. Historically, good faith has its origin in the Roman
Law. And another name of this principle in the Roman Law is bona fides. It gained its
influence as a result of a specific standard clause, inserted at the request of the defendant
into the procedural formula which defining the issue to be tried by the judge. Ultimately,
it gives the judge discretion to decide the case before him in accordance with what
appeared to be fair and reasonable (Zimmerman & Whittaker, 2000).

At present, mainly under the law regime of the continental system, the notion of good
faith comes from the establishment of a theory of culpa in contrahendo by the Rudolf
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von Jhering in 1861. The theory addresses the specific problem presented by a
contracting party, who has taken the initiative to enter into a contract, then sought its
nullity on the grounds that he had been in error. The theory has an objective to protect the
co-contracting party who had relied on the appearance of a valid contract and had
suffered a prejudice flowing from the fact that his legitimate confidence had been
deceived or misled. The legal concept in Von Jhering´s theory fully resemble the regime
of pre-contractual duty in the formation of contract. Therefore, the principle of good faith
originated from the Roman law and the theory of culpa in contrahendo was adopted
primarily in the German, French and Italian contract laws (Mussy, 2000).

For the common law system, particularly the English law, the notion of good faith
principle is linked to the doctrine of caveat emptor which was established in the 16th
century. It means that the buyer should be aware of fraud and or abuses of the
seller/manufacturer. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide an out for the
buyer/merchant against defects that are plainly and obviously the object of one`s sense
and attributed liability to the seller only for a defect that can not be discovered by sight
and is a matter of skill or collateral proof.

According to Gordley (2000) the legal concept of good faith is very difficult to define.
The jurist can only list different situations or pitfalls upon which courts have found this
requirement to be violated. Nevertheless, considering the importance of good faith
principle as an instrument to control over the contractual terms and its application, it is
mainly better to refer several definitions about the good faith. The Uniform Commercial
Code article 3-103 (a)(4) defines the good faith as honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. Thomas (1996, pp. 29) added that a
good faith principle demands or may demand honesty, candour, openness, equal
bargaining, fair dealing, assistance, cooperation, protection and disclosure of material
facts. The definition of good faith principle is not a fixed one, but more flexible, broader
and growing concept. It also has its meaning that a party must keep his word, refrain from
deceit and overreaching and honour obligations that are only implicit in his contract. And
neither party should mislead or take advantage of the other. It has been understood that
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the legal concept of good faith principle has various elements. Among those elements,
several main aspects that are thought will play dominant role in observing the good faith
principle; namely, honesty, not to mislead, disclosure and fair dealing.

Under the perspective of German contract law, the principle of good faith has three basic
functions : First, legal basis of interstitial law-making by the judiciary. Second, it forms
basis of legal defence in private lawsuit. Third, it provides statutory basis for reallocating
risks in private contracts (Ebke & Steinhaver, 1994, pp. 171). Those functions will give a
broad basis for the court to establish a new cause of action where no cause of action
existed in the statutory law. At the same time, it enables the plaintiff to seek remedy for
unwanted contract and undesired contract or fundamental change in the contractual
relationship between the time the contract was entered into and the agreed upon time of
performance For example, when one buy a defective product without knowing that such
product was defective, the buyer may sue the seller for remedy under the regime of poor
performance, not non-performance. Although, at the time of suing the seller, no statutory
basis is applicable.

II.1.2. The Scope of Good Faith Principle
Each contract has its own specific nature. There is no guarantee that based on the
freedom of contract, the party of a contract will feel satisfied and fair for the result of a
contract. It is not uncommon that the party may feel that such contract is totally unfair
and was formed under the unbalance situation between the parties. This unbalance
situation may be arisen out in the form of unbalanced information between the parties, or
it could be one party is depending too much on another party, so it creates a condition
that the advantageous party has exploited the disadvantageous party.

The existence of good faith principle balances the role of freedom of contract and the
question of fairness and honesty in a contract. In the issues of a contract, two main scopes
are very important; namely, in the bargaining-process and in the performance of a
contract itself. Therefore, the application of the good faith principle is under the scope of
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bargaining-process or pre-contractual relationship as well as in the performance of the
contract.

II.1.2.1. Pre-Contractual Duty.
A contract is a product of free will of the party. Accordingly, all elements, such
consideration, terms and conditions, and its collateral warranty in a contract, constitute a
will of the parties involved. Thus, the pre-contractual duty of the good faith principle is to
assure that a freedom of contract still becomes a basis for the validity of a contract.
Because no legal system would legitimize use of violence, fraud or other unlawful means
in the negotiating or bargaining-process (Cohen,1994, pp.25). If a contract is concluded
by use of violence or fraud, it means that such contract is not a product of a free will of
the contracting parties. In other words, the freedom of contract in the bargaining-process
is limited through the prohibition for the contracting parties not being allowed to act so as
to frustrate the pre-conditions for the existence of freedom of contract. In the context of
the frustration of pre-conditions, the principle identifies two main aspects which are
categorized as defects. Those are in the will of the contracting party as well as in the
promises stated in the period of negotiation. For the will of the contracting party, defect is
found when one party makes a contract as a result of a mistake, misrepresentation, duress
or undue influence. In the second circumstance, the defect exists when breach of a
promise given or expectation created in the period of the bargaining-process. However, in
this second situation, the promise means something is included as a part of contract in the
form of terms and conditions, and or representation; it does not embraced the
promise/expectation to negotiate which is deemed legally as no promise at all.

Cohen (1994, pp.33-34) again added that frustration occurs in the will of the contracting
party if there is discrepancy

between the right will of the party and the real one

expressed in a contract. This type of contract is commonly called an unwanted contract.
Then, for the second case, the breach of promise happens when expectation given in the
negotiation did not materialize in the contract. This is known as an undesired contract.
However, in practice, these situations are imperceptible. Although these defects are
difficult to differ from each other, the core thing that needs to be confirmed in the context
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of application of the good faith principle in the bargaining-process is the influence of
those defects to mislead in the formation of a contract. If there is influence on the
formation of a contract, the good faith principle under the regime of the German contract
law, may be used to seek remedy by the injured party.

Finally, in the notion of pre-

contractual duty under the regime of good faith principle, the duty of disclosure any
material information needed by each party to form a contract is still a major requirement
that the contracting party must meet precisely to the benefits of fair dealing.

II.1.2.2. Good Faith in the Performance of Contract.
The demand for the application of good faith principle in the performance of a contract is
expressed clearly in several statutory laws. In the US Uniform Commercial Code section
1-203 stated that “ every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement”. Even under the scheme of the international
transaction, the duty of good faith in the contract performance has its important position
as it mentioned in the article 1.7 of UNDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts 1994 stating that each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing in the international trade.

Weitzenböck (2002) states, in German, the notion of good faith principle is linked with
the nature of Treu und Glauben which is enshrined in the section 242 of Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB) which provides in general terms that the debtor is bound to perform
according to the requirements of good faith. This statutory law has wide effect in the
German contract law upon which the court may establish the basis of obligation to ensure
a loyal performance of a contract such as a duty of the parties to cooperate, to protect
each other`s interests and to give information. Furthermore, in her article Weitzenböck
also quoted the explanation from the Whittaker and Zimmerman (2000) about the notion
of Treu und Glauben as follows : “Treu….signifies faithfulness, loyalty, fidelity,
reliability; Glaube means belief in the sense of faith and reliance. The combination of
Treu und Glauben is seen to transcend the sum of its component and then is broadly
accepted as a conceptual entity. It suggests a standard of honest, loyal and considerate
behaviour, of acting with due regard for the interests of the other party, and it implies
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and comprises the protection of reasonable reliance. Thus it is not legal rule with specific
requirements that have to be checked but may called an “open” form. Its content cannot
be established in an abstract manner but takes shape only by the way in which it is
applied. In some instances, Farnsworth (1994, pp.160) stated that the duty of good faith
in the performance of contract may not only proscribe conduct or behaviour, but also may
mandate affirmative action as well.

Beside that, under the perspective of the French jurists, the application of good faith in
the performance of contract has two implied meanings for the duty of the contracting
parties. First, a duty to act loyally; and second, a duty to cooperate. The first duty
stipulates that one party must free from bad faith, disloyalty and from manoeuvres which
will make the performance of the contract impossible or more onerous for such party. A
party is obliged to be judged to be in breach of loyalty duty if he imposes pecuniary
hardship which is disproportionate or unfair to the usefulness of the object which the
contract is purposed to achieve. Thus, the duty to cooperate contains the meaning of
obligation to disclose the information or knowledge about certain facts in which one
party has an interest to know in order to perform a contract, for example : in the sale of
goods, the seller should disclose the information about its mode of use, manual to sue and
certain things should not to be done, because it may creates dangers. In addition, a duty to
cooperate implies the necessity of the party to facilitate the performance of the contract
by the other party.

Therefore, the concept of good faith in the performance of contract consists of two main
types. These are the objective concept and the subjective concept. An objective concept
of good faith performance refers the behaviour or conduct of the honest businessman and
under the perspective of subjective concept relates to the honest judgement of the party
during the performance of a contract. Weitzenböck (2002) again provides the opinion of
the Levanti in her legal writing about the relationship of good faith performance and the
notion of abuse of rights, upon which the negative and positive duty of each party in a
contract are recognised. Levanti said that the notion of negative duty of good faith
performance means that a duty not to abuse of one`s position so as not to unjustly
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aggravate the situation of the other party. For the positive duty of good faith performance
requires a contracting party to safeguard the usefulness of a contract for the other party
insofar as this does not import an appreciable sacrifice of one´s reason for contracting.

An example of the objective concept on the good faith performance can be seen from the
US UCC section 1-203 which defined it as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned”. The word “conduct” fall under the category of objective concept.

II.1.3. Main Features of the Good Faith Principle
II.1.3.1. Duty of Disclosure
Any contract upon which the commercial transaction is established, always involves an
exchange of information between the contracting parties. No transaction clothed in a
contract will be concluded without involvement of proper information. This information
has its function to give a clear picture about the nature of the transaction itself. Mostly,
the information will articulate to the subject-maters or object of the contract. The result
intended from this exchange information is to get a fair dealing of the transaction
between the parties. Under the regime of good faith principle, an exchange of information
about the object of the contract is under the scope of performing an honesty in fact. Then
it should be delivered to the other party and negative duty as to not mislead for his own
benefit. Having considered, the paramount importance of the information in a contract,
the principle determines the necessity to impose a duty of disclosure. The general
interpretation about this, it is a duty to disclose, inform or speak any information related
to the execution of a contract. It applies commonly to the pre-conclusio n of a contract as
well as in the performance of contract. However, it focuses on largely in the negotiating
process.

According to the Mussy(2000), generally, in relation to a contract, information may be
considered in two ways : on the one hand, there is the information as the main object of
the transaction and, on the other hand , which they are mainly common, it is obliged to
give as a certain set of information is purely secondary. Therefore, the next question is
how to determine the nature of information for the benefits of concluding a contract.
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Fabre-Magnan (1994, pp. 102-103) explains the nature of information by three concepts :
first, a party has only to disclose such information as is relevant having regard to the
subject-matter of the contrac t and to the obligations undertaken by parties; second, such
information should be essential, in which case the conclusion of the contract depends
upon it, or such information is material in which case it will only influence the conditions
under which the contract is concluded. Then a nullity of contract may be awarded as
remedy for the breach of only disclosing essential information. The notion of essential or
material information should be a question of fact determined by the judiciary settlement,
and material facts are not opinion of the party. In addition, one may be deemed to
conduct a non-disclosure act if remaining silent and failing to dispel a known
misunderstanding of the other contracting party. In other words, the duty to disclose is an
active duty, not a passive one. Thirdly, such information is likely to be useful for the
basis of deciding a contract. If the information is not useful or even if it could cause
damage, so that it does not have to be disclosed. For example, in the case of medical
practice, a surgeon has no duty to disclose the exceedingly rare risks arising out of an
operation, because such knowledge could cause such patient to refuse to undergo a very
beneficial operation.

Furthermore, the duty to disclose is established based on several basis of circumstances.
Those are : a) it arises as a result of unequal information; b) the actual knowledge of the
contracting parties about the relevant information as well as the fact that such information
is useful; c) no duty to disclose for the information already known; d) a contracting party
may ignore the information provided by the other party. Under this circumstance, if such
ignorance creates damage to such party, so no damages for that. In other words, the law
does not relieve a person from the consequences of folly, imprudence and or lack of
foresight (Birks & Yin, 1994, pp.79); e) the party is allowed to be unaware of information
if : such information is impossible to know or one party relies on legitimately from the
information guaranteed by the other party; f) in the context of the absence of knowledge
or information, no party may use it as valid evidence to defence himself from the duty of
disclosure if his absence of information is illegitimate. From this item, there is an implied

15

meaning that a party must have knowledge that ought to be known or is deemed to be
known by him.

What it has been mentioned above, could be referred to the continental law system,
mainly in the French or German contract law. Nevertheless, in the perspective of the
common law system, the story of the duty to disclose has its different character, specially
in the English contract law. English law has been hostile to the imposition of duty of
disclosure(Fabre-Magnan, 1994, pp.106), although there was a doctrine of caveat emptor
which requires the buyer to be aware and conduct a prudent action to examine the goods
to be sold under the sale and purchase transaction. In order to avoid buying defective
goods, there still remains one major principle applied to the English contract law.
However, such hostility against the duty of disclosure does not occurs in the context of
insurance contract, which is categorized as contracts uberrimae fidei, which will be
explained in detail in the following chapter. The reasons behind the hostility is opinion
from common law jurists that the doctrine of duty of disclosure is very difficult to be
circumscribed within the proper limits. In addition, such opinion was supported by the
development of economic analysis of law, which was established by the prominent
writers such as Anthony Kronman, Richard Posner, Bernard Rudden, etc.

The common conclusion taken from the study of those writers is no one who invest his
resources to gathering information should be forced to disclo se to the other party during
the formation of contract (Fabre-Magnan, 1994, pp. 107). If he is permitted widely not
to disclose information, it will encourage investment in the acquisition of information
which finally brings benefits to the society at large. In other words, no obligation to
disclose information derived from the basic thought that it is always a cost spent
inherently by one party to gather information, so that without no reward to disclose such
information, no obligation to disclose at all. However, there is possibility to disclose
information in which such information has been casually acquired without any special
investment, for example : in the sale of a house, the seller of the house should disclose
information about the defects in the house, because such information is casually acquired
by the seller by reason of his living in the house.
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II.1.3.2. Representation and Warranty
According to Beatson (2002) representation means a statement or an assurance made by
the contracting party served as to produce in mind of the other contracting party a belief
that facts exist which render the proposed bargain advantageous to the interest of the
other party. It also explained that a warranty is an agreement which refers to the subject
matters of a contract as collateral to the main purpose of such contract, not as an essential
part of the contract, either intrinsically or by agreement. The statement as mentioned
above in the context of representation is about stating a fact, not intention, opinion or law
(Treitel, 1989).

Theoretically, the legal concept of representation and warranty can be differed from the
essential part of the contract which is called terms and conditions. Nevertheless, in
practice, it is very difficult to determine such difference between representation and
warranty and the terms and conditions. Having considered, the condition, which is the
most essential part of a contract, might be in the form of a statement of fact, or a promise
which is commonly felt under the category of notion of the representation and warranty.
In addition, warranty has a similar function like representation to ensure that certain facts
exist or not.

There are two types of warranty, and those are applied particularly in the marine
insurance law. The first warranty called affirmatory warranty which has the meaning that
a certain state of affairs exists at the time of making the warranty. Secondly, a promissory
warranty binds its maker to a promise to do or to refrain from doing something during the
performance of contract, or a certain of fact shall exist during the performance of contract
(Hare, 2002). Both representation and warranty induce the contracting party to enter into
a contract. However, their difference slightly may be pointed out by saying the notion of
representation mainly has to induce in the period of negotiation to the contracting party to
entering in a contract, and the notion of warranty which is largely decisive one by serving
as to assure or guarantee the promise or statement which finally lead to the conclusion of
the contract in the negotiation as well as in the performance of a contract. In the nature of
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their remedies, both representation and warranty may cause the injured party to avoid the
contract. Further, this sub -section will focus mainly on the discussion of representation,
owing to the context of utmost good principle under English law, which separates the
role of warranty law in the application of the utmost good faith principle

Specifically, in the context of representation, if one contracting party conducts a
misleading statement in the formation of contract, such situation is defined as
misrepresentation. It is simply a representation that is untrue (Furmston, 2001). The
misleading statement, upon which the misrepresentation exists, may consists of three
categories : first, it called “puff”, a commendatory expression which by its virtue of its
vagueness or extravagance would not be expected to and does not ground any form of
liability; second, the preliminary statement may be intended by neither party to have
contractual effect, but may seriously affect the inclination of one party to enter into the
contract; third, the preliminary statement may be a term of the contract or constitute a
warranty collateral to the contract, if the making the statement undertakes or guarantees
that it is true.

However, the first type is not sufficient to meet the nature of misrepresentation, owing to
the nature of misrepresentation that should comply with several requirements upon which
the liability may be imposed below.
1. There must be a false representation
A mere silence does not constitute a misrepresentation. However, there are three
circumstances that may fall under the scope of misrepresentation. These are, firstly,
where silence distorts positive representation; secondly, where the contract requires
uberrima fidei; thirdly, where a fiduciary relation exists between contracting parties.
2. It could be partial non-disclosure and active concealment
3. Representation of opinion is normally insufficient
4. Expression of intention or prediction commonly is insufficient, unless for the person
who has a special knowledge and skill. It may contain a representation of fact, that
the maker of the statement have a duty to exercise reasonable care in making it.
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5. Not a representation of law
6. The representation must be addressed to the party misled.
7. Representation must be unambiguous
8. Opportunities for inspection
When the representee does investigate and accordingly rely not so much upon such
misrepresentation as upon the accuracy of the investigation, the cause of action for an
operative misrepresentation will fail. In other word, no relief for being have a weak or
crippled judgement after investigation to the representation has been performed
(Birks & Yin, 1994, pp.79).
9. Representation must induce the contract.

II.1.3.3. Nature of Inducement
Relating to the context of misleading statement and item j above regarding the
inducement to enter into a contract through misrepresentation. The misrepresentation
should still be treated as the misleading statement whether such statement of fact is
included in a contract or not. Because the core notion of misrepresentation is the effect of
pre-contractual statements to induce the other party to enter into contract. The notion of
inducement is the most predominant factor to justify the existence of representation and
unwanted/undesired contract made by the other party as a result of the misleading
statement or misrepresentation. Based on such general overview, the further basic
question may be arisen out what is really the meaning of inducement. Furmston (2001)
explained that the meaning of inducement is as misrepresentation which have produced a
misunderstanding in the other party´s mind and that misunderstanding must have been
one of the reasons which induced him to make a contract. It also was intended to cause
and has in fact caused the other parties to enter into a contract. That is described precisely
why a merely false statement, without the notion of actual inducement, shall not give rise
to a cause of action or damages in the form of avoiding the contract.

Nevertheless, the notion of inducement and misrepresentation is legally acceptable or
harmless if the party is misled under the circumstances below :
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1. Never knew of its existence
A party misled must always be ready to prove that an alleged misrepresentation had an
effect upon his mind. This duty should not be met definitely if he was never aware that
it had been made. For example, if a buyer of stocks in a company claimed that he had
been induced to purchase such stocks by a misrepresentation of publication of the false
reports regarding the financial state of the company, he would fail in his cause of action
for remedy if he is unable to prove that he had read one complete report of the company
financial affairs or that anyone had told him of their contents.

2. Did not allow it to affect his judgement
There is no ground for remedy in the context of misrepresentation if the party misled
does not allow or waive the representation to influence his judgement, even though it
was designed to that end. As explained by the Furmston (2001) through the case of
Smith v.Chadwick (1884) where party misled frankly admitted in cross-examination
that he had been in no degree influenced by this fact. Therefore, no misrepresentation
exists
Another situation may arise, if the other party after given a representation, do not rely
on it, but he preferred to rely on his own judgement or business sense or upon an
independent report which he specially obtained. As decided by the House of Lords in
the Attwood v Small case (Furmston, 2001) that no remedy in the form of rescission
under the regime of misrepresentation when the buyers had relied solely on the
judgement of the independent agents about the accuracy of the statements than the
vendor himself.,

3. He was aware of its untruth
A complete bar to obtain remedy for misrepresentation is when a representee has
possessed actual and complete knowledge of the true facts or the knowledge of untruth
of the misrepresentation , since the claimant could not claim that he has been misled by
the statement of facts, even such misrepresentation was made fraudulently.

Lord

Dunedin added that no one is entitled to make a statement which on the face of it
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conveys a false impression and then excuse himself on the ground that the person to
whom he made it had available the means of corrections (Furmston,2001).

II.1.3.4. Types of Misrepresentation
Commonly, the misrepresentation is divided into three categories as follows :
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Furmston (2001) defined that a fraudulent misrepresentation is a false statement which
when made, the representor did not honestly believe to be true. Under common law
system, the fraudulent misrepresentation not only renders the contract voidable at the
suit of the party misled, but also gives rise to an action for damages in respect of the
deceit (Beatson, 2002). Furthermore, he precisely added the definition of fraudulent
misrepresentation through quoting the explanation of Lord Herschell in the case of
Derry v Peek (1990) by saying that :

First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and
nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud id proved when it is shown that a
false representation has been made, (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth,
or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Although I have treated the
second and the third as distinct cases, I think the third is but an instance of the
second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real
belief in the truth of what he states.

2. Negligent Misrepresentation
It defines by stating that an action in damages would lie for negligent misrepresentation
if there was a fiduciary relationship between parties where the duty of care exists
(Beatson, 2002 & Furmston, 2001). Therefore, in other circumstances a negligent
misrepresentation made by one party to the other preparatory to entering into a contract
may facilitate a legal basis to do an action for damages if the person making it has or
professes to have special knowledge or skill in respect of the facts stated. Or if the
representation in the context of the way of make it, is to be classified as neither casual
nor unconsidered but to be relied on.
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3. Innocent Misrepresentation.
An innocent misrepresentation means a misrepresentation is free from element of fraud
or negligent statement.
II.2. Principle of Good Faith under Tort Law
According to Jones (2002) the law of tort is primarily concerned with providing a remedy
to persons who have been harmed by the others, owing to the conflicts of interest in any
society are bound to lead to the infliction of loss. The two main functions of tort law are
to allocate as well as to prevent the losses. In addition, Rogers (2002) through the
Winfield´s definition of tort which explained that tort as a tortuous liability arises from
the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is towards persons generally and its
breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages.
The existence of good faith principle under tort law relies on the legal conceptualization
of the tort law itself which establishes a mechanism of remedy for breach of duty
imposed by the statutory law. Misrepresentation as well as non-disclosure upon which the
breach of good faith principle committed by the other contracting party may fall under
the legal scope of the tort law. So that, the notion of good faith principle itself may exist
in the scope of contractual basis as well as statutory basis or both of them exist. Mostly,
in the context of forming a contract in the specific subject such as marine insurance, the
good faith principle, which is derived from the implementation of the duty of disclosure
as well as representation, will be applicable both in the contractual basis and statutory
basis. In other words, the contractual and tortuous duties may co-exist on the same facts
(Rogers, 2002). For example, if there is a case about a claim for damages as a result of
buying a defective product, it may involve the notion of contract law as well as tort law.
The seller may be liable on the some facts in contract and the other facts in tort to the
buyer.
Although, the enforcement of good faith principle may be undertaken under the regime of
contract law and tort law, the legal differences between both regimes can still be
described. These differences are : firstly, tortuous duty exist by virtue of the law itself
and do not depend upon the agreement or consent of the persons subjected to them;
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secondly, in tort the content of the duties is fixed by the law whereas the content of
contractual duties is fixed by the contract itself; thirdly, the “core” of a contract is the
idea of enforcing promises, whereas the law of tort has its aims principally at the
prevention or compensation of harms.

In the context of third difference, it can lead to the two major consequences : first
consequence, that a mere failure to act will not usually be actionable in tort, for such act
should be intended as legally binding and supported by consideration or the formality of a
deed; second consequence, that damages can not be claimed in tort for a “loss of
expectation”, or as it is sometimes expressed, damages in contract put the claimant in the
position he would have been in had the contract been performed, whereas damages in tort
put him in the position he would have been in had the tort not been committed.

II.2.1. Existence of Negligence in the Good Faith Duty
Specially, the role of tort law in the scope of good faith principle is derived from the legal
conceptualization of negligence. The concept of negligence has an important position
under tort law. It defined tort as a breach of a legal duty to take care which results in
damage to the claimant (Rogers,2002). Breach of duty is concerned with the standard of
care that ought to have been adopted in the circumstances and whether the defendant´s
conducts fell below that standard. Hence, a legal conceptualization of a duty which exists
and breach by the defendant is the core ingredient of the tort or negligence. In order to
identify the existence of a duty to care, Jones (2002) said that one should determine first
the availability of the several circumstances; namely, first, foreseeability of the damage;
second, a sufficiently “proximate” relationship between the parties; third, although where
(1) and (2) are satisfied, it must be “just and reasonable” to impose such duty.

Furthermore, if analysing the legal concept of negligence and the breach of duty to
disclose as well as misrepresentation under the regime of good faith principle, one may
see the legal similarity, upon which the representor may act negligently in performing his
duty to disclose and to represent the facts truly and honestly. At the same time, it can also
create a wider legal basis for the claimant to claim damage to the person who committed
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negligent acts. However, this claim for damages under the tort law prohibits the claimant
to insert the profitable expectation, which is always allowable in the case of breach of
contractual duties.

II.2.2. Liability for Misstatement
Besides that, in the absence of statutory basis for imposing the notion of good faith
principle, in the English Law, one may use the legal concept of liability for statement in
order to claim for damages. The existence of liability for untrue statement has wider
coverage. Among the features of liability for untrue statement, one major features is one
is liable for untrue statement if such statement causes the other person to act in reliance
on it and suffer loss as a result (Rogers,2002). This liability for misstatement is based on
the broader concept of assumption of responsibility. It comes out as a response of the
common rule in the tort law which stated that there could be no liability in tort law for a
false statement honestly made. The clear example for this circumstance is the relationship
between the professional advisers with their clients. In other words, the combination of
the assumption of responsibility concept with the reliance theory creates the regime of
liability for untrue statement.

According to Beatson (2002) and Rogers (2002) the legal theory of the assumption of
responsibility for liability of misstatement was crystallized firstly in the case of Hedley
Byrne & Co.Ltd v. Hellers & Partners (1964) by which the House of Lords decided that
although there was no duty of care on facts, but nevertheless agreed that a duty of care in
making statements was a legal possibility.
From the same case, it was held that a duty of care could exist where there was an
assumption of liability such as to create a “special relationship”. In order to obtain a clear
legal concept of a “special relationship” in the context of liability for statement, Rogers
(2002) again quoted from the legal reasoning of the Lord Oliver in the case of Caparo plc
v. Dickman which described the typical character of a special relationship, inter alia, as
follows : first, it is known, either actually or inferentially, that the advice so
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communicated is likely to be acted upon by the advisee for that purpose without
independent inquiry; secondly, it is so acted upon by the advisee to his detriment.

Accordingly, the regime of liability for statement shall exist hand in hand with the
application of the assumption of responsibility theory, reliance theory and the
requirements of a special relationship.
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CHAPTER III
THE APPLICATION OF THE UTMOST GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE UNDER
ENGLISH MARINE INSURANCE LAW

III.1. An Overview of Marine Insurance Contract
Marine insurance is a contractual basis relationship between the assured and insurer with
precise rights and obligations stipulated in the contract of marine insurance. In general, a
marine insurance contract is similar to other contracts upon which law of contract, will
apply. However, owing to the specific conditions of a maritime adventure, it has
inherently different nature in the terms of the legal process of the contract formation and
its legal form after the contract is concluded. And under the English marine insurance
law, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 prevails. A legal definition of marine insurance
contract has been provided in the section 1 which stated that a contract of marine
insurance is a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in
manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, that is to say, the losses
incident to marine adventure.
Furthermore, such losses from the marine adventure must be caused by something called
as the maritime perils. No loss shall be indemnified, unless it is caused by the maritime
perils agreed in the contract of marine insurance. Each party has freedom to determine
any other perils that shall be included in the marine insurance contract. Additionally, it
may cover a mixed risk between land and sea voyage. A transit clause attached to the
institute cargo clause constitutes a proof of that.

For the definition of maritime perils, it has meaning as the perils consequent on, or
incidental to, the navigation of the sea such as fire, explosion, detainment, and war perils.
Commonly, it is called to the peril of the sea. When the incident of maritime adventure
occurs, the insurer will indemnify after conducting a survey to verify the incident and
then determine the level of loss experienced by the assured. If the level of
indemnification was already agreed by both parties, insurer shall refer to such agreed
value of indemnification.
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III.1.1. Effecting A Marine Insurance Contract
There are three main parties involved in the placing of marine insurance. They are the
assured, broker and insurer. The assured is the one who want to buy a ma rine insurance
cover, and the insurer is the one who want to sell the insurance cover. Then the role of
marine insurance broker is to provide service to aid for effecting a marine insurance
cover on behalf of the assured´s interest. The use of broker is not compulsory. The
assured may effect the marine insurance contract by himself. However, as a result of the
common practice, most marine insurance contracts are effected through broker,
particularly in the London market. The broker shall be very helpful to the assured in order
to get his full cover as well as to aid him for claim settlement.

III.1.2. Slip
Slip is a written proposal of insurance made by the broker with the intention to offer to
the insurer for acceptance, subject to negotiation. The existence of slip for placing the
marine insurance contract expresses the unique practice conducted in the London market.
If the insurer has agreed with the slip made by the broker, he will sign the slip as an
evidence of acceptance about the certain percentage of total risk he will accept, and write
his initials, reference and the date of signing. And the acceptance of insurer through his
signing on the slip must be unconditional. This method of process is called as slip placing
system ( Thomas, 1996, pp.9). The acceptance of a certain percentage by the insurer
explain the principle of spreading risk in the marine insurance business. It is very
uncommon practice in marine insurance business to place insurance cover only by the
single underwriter. Thus, when the slip is signed by the insurer, so that the contract of
marine insurance is concluded legally.

III.1.3. Marine Policy
Besides the slip, another legal requirement needed to effect marine insurance cover is the
marine policy. A marine policy is the instrument in which the contract of marine
insurance is generally embodied. The essential design is that the policy terms and
conditions are to reflect the contract of the parties concluded on the slip terms and
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conditions. The insurer is obliged to issue a marine policy, after contract concluded. One
should be aware of the issuance of the policy, since the marine insurance contract will be
inadmissible unless it is embodied in a marine policy. The word “inadmissible” means
that the marine insurance contract only be recognized by the court as a valid evidence for
the insurance cover if marine policy has been produced for such cover.
If there is discrepancies between slip and policy, the slip wording will prevail the policy
wording(Thomas,1996, pp. 16). A remedy for that discrepancies is to rectify the wording
of a marine policy based on the exact wording of the slip.
III.2. Marine Insurance Contract is Uberrimae Fidei
A marine insurance contract under the regime of English Law is treated legally as a
specific nature compared to other types of commercial contract. It was proven by the
application of overreaching principle of the utmost good faith to the contract of marine
insurance that is commonly contradictive to the general perception of the legal status of
the good faith principle in the common law system including the English law system, by
which, English law has declined to adopt a general principle of good faith (Beatson &
Friedman, 1994). The different legal treatment of utmost good faith duty showed the use
of court discretion and rule of law principle in the English marine insurance law, which
suited the concept of modern contract law, upon which the demand to give greater weight
to substantive fairness in the context of marine insurance contract (Eggers, 1999).

The special role of this principle to the marine insurance, can be seen from the expressed
statutory law, section 17-20 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which categorized marine
insurance contract as an uberrimae fidei, upon which the notion of the utmost good faith
principle is a must. Robinson (1998) stated that uberrimae fidei is a phrase used to
express the perfect good faith, concealing nothing, with which a contract must be made.
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 was drafted by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers and was the last
pieces of codifying legislation. The 1906 Act did not seek to change the law, but rather
was a codification of some 200 years of judicial decisions (Merkin, 2000). One
predominant court decision had been used to formulate that Act, particularly for the
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principle of the utmost good faith in the English law system, was the decision of Lord
Mansfield in the case of Carter v. Boehm in 1776 (Thomas, 1996, pp.32-33). He stated
the strong nature legally of utmost good faith duty under the insurance contract by saying
that :
First, insurance is a contract upon speculation. The special facts, upon which
contingent chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the
insured only : the underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to
mislead the underwriter into a belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to
induce him to estimate the risqué, as if it did not exist. The keeping back such
circumstance is a fraud, and therefore the policy is void. Although the suppression
should happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention : yet still the
underwriter is deceived, and the policy is void; because the risqué run is really
different from the risqué understood and intended to be run, at the time of the
agreement.

From the legal observance of the Lord Mansfield above, several legal key points can be
analysed. These were recognized as the major legal basis to establish the systematic legal
concept of the utmost good faith principle in the English marine insurance law. First of
all, the nature of marine insurance transaction which is named as the speculation one, and
to manage this transaction is far from speculated action; the facts from the assured is a
must to be informed to the insurer as a main basis for the judgement of the risks.
Therefore, from this legal statement, the notion of duty of disclosure was evolved. And at
the same time, all the facts disclosed must be represented by the assured while the insurer
will trust on the honesty and truthfulness of the facts disclosed as well as representation
made by the assured. The existence of misleading or inducement from facts stated by the
assured plays important legal roles to determine the possibility to give remedy for the
insurer. A remedy for the insurer as a result of non-disclosure as well as
misrepresentation which made the insurer to be misled and or induced to place the marine
cover for the assured is to avoid the contract, a draconian remedy. The critical point is the
remedy to avoid the contract being awarded on the basis of mistake made by the assured.
In other words, regardless of the gravity of fault when one breaches the utmost good faith
(fraudulent, innocent, or negligent) the insurer will be given the right to avoid the
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contract. In addition, the decision of the Lord Mansfield was directed apparently to focus
more on the burden of the assured for the observance of the utmost good faith principle.
III.3. Legal Nature of the Utmost Good Faith Principle under MIA 1906
The section 17 determines the nature of that principle to the insurance contract as “a
contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the
utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the
other party. There is neither precise definition about the utmost good faith principle in
the MIA 1906, nor the legal guidance on what fields of operation this principle may be
applied, particularly in the context of deciding the remedy of avoidance. Rather, this
principle will be defined as to the legal concept of the uberrimae fidei and the complex
combination legal concept derived from the section 17,18, 19 and 20.
In the beginning, unlike the legal conceptualization which formulated by the Lord
Mansfield was expressly stressed on the duties of the assured to observe the utmost good
faith principle, section 17 of MIA 1906 as mentioned above maintains the balance of
obligation to comply with the utmost good principle for both the insurer and the assured.
At least from the legal expression in the section 17, the assured has the right to demand
the insurer to observe the utmost good faith principle. Nevertheless, this notion of the
balance of duty for both the assured and the insurer, particularly the obligation of the
insurer in the context of this principle, has changed when it applies to. It can be seen the
settlement of the case of Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd
(1990) upon which the

Slade SJ, in the Court of Appeal, made different legal

formulation as decided by the House of Lords by saying that :
In our judgement, the duty falling upon the insurer must at least extend to disclosing
all facts known to him which are material either to the nature of the risk sought to
be covered or the recoverability of a claim under the policy which a prudent insured
would take into account in deciding whether or not to place the risk for which he
seeks cover with that insurer.
However, the judgement has been rejected when it was settled in the English highest
court, the House of Lords. The House of Lords had agreed the general observation of the
obligation to comply with the good faith by the insurer, but it seemed that the Lords in
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this same case as quoted by Thomas (1996, pp.31), having decided a contrary view by
deciding that the primary insurer was not under duty to disclose the discovered fraud on
the part of the assured´s broker to the assured. In other words, in its application to this
legal case, the nature of a balance obligation between the insurer and the assured in the
observance of the utmost good faith principle was not justified legally, it tends to be more
in favour to the side of the insurer.
III.4. Sanctioning System : Single Remedy ?
Referring to this section, the failure to observe the utmost good faith principle creates a
single remedy without no more alternative. Such remedy is an avoidance of the contract
by either party. The legal meaning of “..the contract may be avoided by the other
party…” is the contract is rescinded by such party, and a contract is rescinded if the
injured party makes it clear that he refuses to be bound by any provisions on the contract.
The effect is that contract is terminated ab initio as if it had never existed (Furmston,
2001).

Accordingly, this section affirms only a remedy by avoidance of contract

retrospectively in nature as a single legal choice from the breach. One also should bear in
mind that the nature of the remedy under the section 17 is precisely similar to the legal
nature established by the Lord Mansfield in the case of Carter v. Boehm, upon which the
contract may be avoided when duty of utmost good faith is breached regardless such
breach was as result of the fraudulent, negligent or innocent conducts.
Therefore, the other remedies such as damages in the context of the breach of the utmost
good faith principle, but rescission, are rejected. As it has been decided in the Banque
case upon which the House of Lords dismissed the legal argument that breach of the
utmost good faith duties could sound in damages (Thomas,1996). The legal position
under the MIA 1906 about the single remedy for breach the utmost good faith principle is
affirmed definitely through the decision of the Aiken J, in the case HIH Casualty and
General Insurance Ltd and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others (2001) which
stipulated that the insurers had no right to claim damages against the assured (Chase) for
breach of the duty of utmost good faith; that issue arose only in relation to the contracts
of insurance. And at the same time, the insurers also would not have the right to claim
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damages for the negligent misstatements of brokers (Heaths) in relation to the contracts
of insurance.

Although, it has been provided a single remedy, in the context of complex legal
settlement to the case of breach of utmost good faith principle, the insurer may claim, in
lieu of rescission, for damages based on the grounds of deceit made by the assured´s
broker. As mentioned in the HIH case, the Aiken J states the insurer would on the proper
construction of the contracts of and for insurance have a right to claim damages for
deceit based on the intention or reckless misrepresentation of fact by the Heaths,
insurance broker whether in relation to the contracts of insurance or the contracts for
insurance. Furthermore, the judges of Court of Appeal when examined such case as result
of the appeal from the Chase, again affirmed the possibility to claim for damages against
Chase by the HIH only on the basis of a good claim in deceit. The insurers would have
the right to claim for damages either if such claim submit under section 2 (1) of the
Misrepresentation Act 1967.

A good claim in deceit means that the claimant should prove the five legal natures that
must be met in the context of such case : (1) there must be a representation of fact made
by words or conduct; (2) the representation must be made with knowledge that it is or
may be false. It must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine
belief that it is true;(3) the representation must be made with the intention that it should
be acted upon by the claimant, in the manner which resulted in damage to him;(4) it must
be proved that the claimant has acted upon the false statement;(5) it must be proved that
the claimant suffered damage by so doing (Rogers, 2002)
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III.5. Utmost Good Faith : Its Scope of Application
III.5.1. Pre-Contractual Stage
A duration of the application of the utmost good faith principle applies mainly to the precontractual stage. The meaning of the application of utmost good faith in the precontractual stage reaches the duration of before or at the time of formation a contract.
Owing to the nature of the insurance transaction, the reasons behind this pre-contractual
good faith issue are to give earlier and strong legal protection for the insurer from the
dishonesty or unfair insurance transaction, and to ensure the insurer in the same position
as the assured and gives the insurer the same means and opportunity of judging the risk.
This application is widely accepted as predominant legal practice when one deals with
the utmost good faith principle in the contract. In addition, most of the time, claim for
breach of the utmost good faith principle by the injured party on the ground of the breach
of utmost good faith occurs before the contract is concluded. Its recognition of that precontractual stage as a major application of the utmost good faith principle can be seen
from section 18 item 1 and the several cases below :

18 (1)- Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the
insurer, before the contract is concluded…...”.
The importance of pre-contractual stage as a major concern in its application, has a
reasonable ground from the breach of the good faith duty in the negotiation process
which mislead the judgement of the either party (often:insurer) in respect of placing
insurance coverage. It also become a common legal basis for the insurer while deciding
to rescind the contract retrospectively on the ground of the breach of the utmost good
faith principle, the stressing of failure to observe this principle in the pre-contractual
stage usually is dominant. The nature of pre-contractual breach has been applied to the
case of non-marine insurance, St. Paul Fire & Insurance Co.Ltd(UK) v. McConnell
Dowell Constructors Ltd. And Others (1993). In that case, the Potter, J stated that :

(1) Having been presented with the risk described and having accepted it on
particular terms and /or at particular premium rates without exclusion or
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qualification, the plaintiffs were entitled to be told and /or defendants were obliged
to disclose, prior to the contract, the change in the proposal represented by the
decision to use spread foundations, whether that decision was made before or after
the proposal was presented and quoted for; the failure to do so clearly amounted to
a material no-disclosure; (2)…then the plaintiffs succeeded to avoid the contract on
the grounds of non-disclosure.
Additionally, when this case was held in the Court of Appeal, all judges decided that the
true state of affairs not disclosed to the underwriters before the contract was made was
that the projects involved and the contractors intended to design and build shallow spread
foundations rather than piled or other deep foundation, and subsequently the appeal by
the assureds were dismissed and the decision taken by Judge Potter J to allow the insurer
avoiding the contact was upheld.

The focus on the pre-contractual breach of utmost good faith was again affirmed by the
other case of Lambert V. Cooperative Insurance Society, Ltd (1975) in the Court of
Appeal when the insurers repudiated the claim on the ground that before the contract of
insurance was concluded the assured had failed to disclose her husband`s first conviction
and on the further or alternative ground that she had failed before the renewal in March,
1972, to disclose the second conviction.

The focus on the pre-contractual duty, namely to observe the duty of utmost good faith in
the course of negotiation has gained its support legally form the judgement of the case of
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and
Others (2001).

The predominant focus on the pre-contractual stage in the context of utmost good faith
duty is to ensure the pre-contractual standard of behaviour between the contracting
parties, insurer as well assured. It seems similar to the legal formulation of the doctrine of
culpa contrahendo, that applied in the civil law states, upon which the remedy should be
recoverable against the party whose blameworthy conducts during the negotiation for a
contract brought about its validity or prevented from its perfection (Kessler & Fine,
1964).
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III.5.2. Post-Contractual Stage
According to Soyer (2003) the existence of post-contractual effect in the application of
utmost good faith principle, particularly in the contract of insurance is relatively new one
in the English marine insurance law. It was firstly acknowledged at the beginning of the
last century and the meaning and its legal nature was not judicially analysed until the
beginning of the 1980s. This kind of post-contractual effect is derived from the broad
meaning of section 17, which does not explicitly restrict the nature of the utmost good
faith duty applied only in the negotiation period.

III.5.2.1. Fraudulent Claim in the Post-Contract Duty
In its legal application, key legal words should be ensured to exist in the case of postcontractual effect of utmost good faith duty which is the presence of any fraudulent
conducts during the currency of marine insurance policy upon which the utmost good
faith post-contractual effect may be established accordingly.

In the context of the insurance contract, the fraudulent claim could take three forms :
either the assured intends to deceive the insurer in order to obtain money or some benefits
from himself or some other person to which, it is known, there is no right; or the assured
submits a claim in a situation where he has no honest belief in the truth of the claim; or
the assured submits a claim recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false, and the claim
is in fact false (Soyer,2003). Furthermore, he stated that the first type of fraudulent claim
is a “pure fraud”. The pure fraud is classified into three categories namely: first, the
assured may assert that he suffered a loss, which has not taken place; secondly, the
assured might make a claim under his insurance policy after deliberately bringing about
the loss; thirdly, the assured taking advantage of a loss might attempt to obtain an
unlawful benefit from the insurer by submitting an inflated or exaggerated claim.

The next question about the third category of pure frauds is how to determine the nature
of exaggeration claim upon which the fraudulent claim could be created. Lord Woolf,
M.R. the judge of the Court of Appeal in the case of Galloway v. Guardian Royal
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Exchange (UK) (1999) has established the method to measure the nature of exaggeration
claim which is under the category of the fraudulent claim by comparing the percentage of
claim that is deemed as a fraudulent claim with the total amount of the claim. In addition,
the Millet, L.J., has a different approach in the case of determining whether the limit of
exaggeration claim is fraudulent or not by considering the fraudulent claim as if it were
the only claim and then considering whether, taken on its own, the fraudulent claim was
sufficiently serious. Therefore, if there is a case of total claim is USD 100,000 with the
exaggerated claim USD 2000, the Millett´s approach would say that such claim is a
fraudulent one, but Lord Woolf would reject it as fraudulent claim. It is strongly
suggested that both methods be used to measure the legal scope of fraudulent contents in
the exaggerated claim (Soyer,2003).

III.5.2.2. Fraud or Culpability is The Legal Basis of the Post-Contractual Duty ?
Back to the main issue in this sub-section, the nature of fraudulent conducts or claim
which successfully triggered the application of post-contractual effect in the duty of
utmost good faith was recognized firstly in the context of judicial settlement from the
court decision in the case of Black King Shipping Corporation and Wayang (Panama)
S.A. v. Mark Ranald Massie which was well-known to the Litsion Pride case (1985). In
that case which states below.
The facts :
The plaintiffs were the owner of the vessel Litsion Pride which was insured against
war risks with the defendant underwriters, syndicates 868 and 505 in the proportion
of 75% and 25 % respectively at a value of USD 4,750,000 for 12 months from 5
pm on July 25, 1982. The clause of war risk trading warranty was included by A.P.
for sailing on the excluded area and the requirement to inform such excluded area
voyage to the insures as soon as practicable.
On May 25, 1982, Litsion Pride was chartered to make a voyage from Europe to a
port in the Persian Gulf, later nominated as Bandar Khomeini. It was common
ground that Bandar Khomeini at the time by far the most dangerous port in the Gulf
attracting additional premium (A.P) at a very substantial rate. She crossed latitude
24 degree north in the straits of Hormuz on August 2, 1982.
By letter dated or purportedly dated August 2, 1982, the plaintiffs` management
company Macedonia Shipping Co. Ltd (Macedonia) wrote to the brokers to
proceeding with war insurance and advise the underwriters accordingly. The
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brokers did not receive the letter until August 11, 1982. And then on August 9,
1982, while the vessel was passing in convoy through the Khormusa Channel at the
head of the Persian Gulf, she was attacked by an Iraqi helicopter and struck by
missile. Her cargo of sugar immediately caught on fire and fire spread to the engine
room and adjoining compartments so that soon afterwards the whole of the after
part of the vessel was ablaze, and water entered the hull. The captain and the crew
were forced to abandon the ship. The vessel drifted aground on to a sand bank
where she broke her back and sank. The incident was notified by Macedonia by
telex to the brokers dated August 11, 1982.
The plaintiff claimed under the policy but the defendants denied liability contending
that there was an implied term that the notification requirements contained in the
warranty, on its proper construction, was a condition precedent to underwriters´
liability for loss in A.P. area. The underwriters further argued that the owners and
/or brokers were fraudulent or at least in breach of a duty of utmost good faith to the
underwriters and that consequently were debarred from recovering under the policy.
Held by the Hirst, J :
1. The letter of August 2, 1982 was concocted and the false information invented
in order to deceive the underwriters in the hope that they would accept the
failure to give notice was innocent oversight.
2. Such letter was a fraud and connected directly with the claim and deemed as
material one in respect of the presentation of the claim.
3. So that ,the plaintiffs were guilty of material fraud and material breaches of
utmost good faith duty.
4. The remedy for that fraudulent conducts in the post-contract of marine
insurance is section 17 which gives the right to the insurer to avoid the contract
ab initio. However, because of the notion of avoidance the contract is not that it
must be avoided, so then in the case of post contract breach it was open to the
underwriters to defend claim without avoiding the contract. At the same time,
owing to the duty not to make fraudulent claim and not to make claims in
breach of the utmost good faith duty was an implied term of the policy, the
underwriters entitled to maintain the defence of the fraudulent claim.
5. In his legal reasoning for the decision of this case, Hirst J also explained that the
section 17 of MIA 1906 requires the continuing duty in the post-contract by
imposing the assured to disclose material facts and not merely to refrain from
dishonest, deliberate or culpable concealment.
Although the decision from the case above recognized legally to the nature of postcontractual dimension of utmost good faith principle which is restricted to the fraudulent
conducts including claim, there are still several critical legal points causing much debate
and or disagreements regarding their fairness and or its logic legally. The first critical
issue of such case is legal assumption/interpretation regarding remedy under section 17
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which provides not only to avoid a contract ab initio but also may reject the claim with
no avoidance remedy at all in the context of post-contract dimension. Soyer (2003)
criticised that no contract law principle as well as no case law explain why a fraudulent
claim should be de-coupled from the policy entitling the insurer to reject the claim only
without affecting the validity of the policy. Secondly, it seems very complicated to
understand the decision to avoid a contract by the underwriters based on the reason of
breaching an implied term of the contract upon which a duty not to make a fraudulent
claim existed. Because when assumed the duty of utmost good faith as an implied term of
a contract, the nature of remedy is totally different. Breach of the duty as an implied term
would give the remedy for terminate the contract prospectively, while the section 17
imposes the remedy of avoidance contract ab initio with retrospective in its nature.

Third critical point is the legal assumption used in that case which stated that section 17
allows to use culpable breach of utmost good faith in the context of post-contract issue as
legal basis to give draconian remedy of the avoidance of the contract. In other words,
fraud is not solely a requirement to impose post-contract duty, negligent acts are also
highly possible as a legal basis for claim of avoiding the contract. Subsequently, from this
circumstance, there is similarity between the nature of breach of the utmost good faith in
the pre-contractual stage as well as in the post-contract dimension. Both require the same
standard of conduct and the same nature of remedy. Additionally, Hirst, J also demanded
the assured to give time to time information during the currency of policy which may
lead to the unnecessary or “endless” duty to inform that should be complied by the
assured.

The decision of Hirst J in the case above was followed precisely by the Evans, J when
decided in the case of The Captain Panagos DP (1982). In this case, the vessel which
was the subject-matter of the insurance contract was grounded and then destroyed by the
fire. Such incident was strongly alleged as a result of deliberate action conducted by the
assured, shipowners. Under the nature of deliberate grounding, not the fire, fraudulent
claim was submitted by the assured. Therefore, based on the legal basis formulated in the
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case of Litsion Pride about the continuing duty of utmost good faith principle, the insurer
is able to avoid the contract ab initio.

The judgement of the Litsion Pride had been criticised as creating an unfair and
disproportionate circumstance through imposing similarity of its remedy to avoid the
contract in the post-contract utmost good faith duty.

III.5.2.3. Legal Scope of Fraudulent Claim in the Post-Contract Duty
The case of Manifest Shipping Co.Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co.Ltd and La Reunion
Europeene (The Star Sea) (2001) shows an effort to relieve that unfair and
disproportionate legal formulation adopted by the Hirst J in the case of Litsion Pride, by
establishing the legal scope of the avoidance of the contract on the ground of the
fraudulent claims. The facts that the Star Sea is owned by the single-ship management
company, and Kappa Maritime which is beneficially owned by the Kollakis family. She
was built in 1974. On May 27,1990, the Star Sea sailed from Corinto in Nicaragua bound
for Zeebrugge with a full cargo of bananas, mangoes, and coffee. On May 29, 1990, as a
ship approached Panama Canal a fire started in her engine-room. It spreads to other parts
of the ship and was not finally put out for several days by which time the ship had
become a constructive total loss. The plaintiff claimed under the insurance policy but the
underwriters denied the liability based on the ground of unseaworthiness of the ship. As
to the emergency pump was useless, ineffective sealing of the engine-room, the master
was incompetent in that he was unaware of the need to use CO2 system as soon as he
realized that the fire could not be fought in any other way and that for the system to be
effective in the engine-room, all the CO2 had to be discharged at once.

After trial was started, the underwriter also contended that the assured was in breach of
duty of utmost good faith when presented the claim of the Star Sea. The legal basis for
this accusation was the assured and their solicitors had misrepresented in witness
statements and expert reports the facts concerning the assured´s state of knowledge about
the causes of the fire onboards the “Kastora”, which they had obtained as a result of the
reports of Dr. Atherton. It was also asserted that the assured had been guilty of non-
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disclosure of the two reports of Dr.Atherton on the Kastora fire. It was alleged that
various people, who were said to be “alter ego” of the assured, had been guilty of
fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation in their witness statements (Soyer,2001).

In respect of this case, Tucker J held that in the absence of fraud or recklessness about
the presentation of the claim, section 17 of MIA 1906 would not be applicable as defence
for the insurer. He also added that when the underwriters rejected the claim or the trial
was started officially, there was no more the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith
principle. Furthermore, when the case was settled in the Court of Appeal, the decision
was upheld precisely with its different notion about the end of duty only based on the
basis of the commencement of the trial proceeding, not when the claim was rejected.

In that same case, the House of Lords upheld the decision taken by the two courts above,
and in specific stipulated that only fraud, not culpability, could be a legal basis to obtain a
defence with the remedy of the avoidance of contract ab initio under section 17 of the
MIA.

Although, the legal certainty has been obtained from the decision of such case above
about the fraud is the only legal basis for the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith, it
was still not precisely clear what kind of fraudulent claims/conducts during the currency
of the policy determined by section 17.

How is the role of materiality as well as

inducement theory in this context. Those legal questions will be covered by the
explanation from the case of the K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v. Certain Lloyd´s
Underwriters Subscribing to Lloyd´s Policy No.25 T 105487 and Ocean Marine
Insurance Co.Ltd and Others (The “Mercandian Continent) (2001). In that case, it was
explained that Trinidian ship repairers were the assured under a liability insurance policy.
They became liable to shipowners (the claimants) under the ship repair contract The
policy contained the following provisions which are relevant about notice of claims :

In the event of any occurrence which may result in a claim….the assured shall give
prompt written notice….and shall keep underwriters fully advised.
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In addition, there were general conditions for claims control by stipulating that
“Underwriters shall be entitled …to control or take over the conduct of investigation
defence and settlement of any claim”. As a result of using the J form policy insurance,
agreed that “If the assured shall make any claim knowing the same to be false and
fraudulent, as regards amount or otherwise, the policy shall become void and all claims
hereunder shall be forfeited”.

As a matter of the vessel, her engine was exploded and severe damage was done to the
vessel. Such incident was accepted due to the negligent repair works done by the assured.
The claimant claimed against the assured for negligent repair and consequential loss.
Notice of a potential claim was given to the insurers and the insurers agreed to take over
the defence of the claim.

Proceedings were started in the English Court by the claimants against the assured and
permission to serve the proceedings out of the English jurisdiction was obtained. The
assured then to the solicitors appointed by the insurer a forged documents (letter of July
1) which the assured thought would assist the solicitors on the issue of the English
jurisdiction. The forgery was discovered and the insurers avoided the liability for breach
of the duty of utmost good faith and breach of contract by the assured.

It was held by the Aikens, J inter alia that :
1.The assured´s fulfilment of the express and implied contractual obligations has nothing
to do with the claim on the policy. They only concerned the provision of information in
relation to a collateral matter, whether the English or Trinidad Court had jurisdiction
could not make any difference to the liability of the insurers, so the insurers were not
going to be prejudiced in respect of either “risqué” or “ speculation” or in relation to his
ultimate liability on the claim. Although, the assured had forged the July 1 letter, it
would not have influenced the outcome on the issue of the assured ´s liability to the
claimants.
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2.The deliberate and culpable misrepresentation such as forged July 1 letter was
immaterial. It had no legal relevance to the assured´s claim, and either the duty of
utmost good faith did not attach to the acts of the assured in producing it or the act was
not a breach of the duty of utmost good faith that gave the insurers the right to avoid
contract.
3.There was no evidence to suggest that the defendant insurers were induced to do
anything in relation to the claim under the policy as a result of production of the July 1
letter; if the “narrow” definition of “materiality” was correct, then the inducement of
the insurers could only be in relation to a fact that was material; if facts that did not
concern the legal liability of the insurers on the claims were immaterial, then there
could be no relevant inducement of the insurers by an immaterial fact; and the insurers
were not entitled to avoid.

When that case was brought to the Court of Appeal, the judges had precisely upheld the
judgement of the Aikens, J based on the similar legal reason that underwriters had
suffered no prejudice as a result of the assured´s fraudulent acts. So that no remedy of the
avoidance of contract will be awarded to the insurer.

Furthermore, the critical legal issues raised by the Longmore, LJ about his judgement in
the Court of Appeal for the same case that variations to the risk, renewals and held
covered clauses, would not be treated legally under post-contractual duty of utmost good
faith.

The nature of materiality and inducement which were required to judge the fraudulent
claim under the regime of the post-contractual duty, again was judged from the
judgement of Toulson J in the case of Agapitos v. Agnew and Others (The “Aegeon”)
(2002) where he decided that the defence of the underwriters to avoid the contract under
the scope of the section 17 for breach of continuing duty of utmost good faith based on
the reason of , during the proceedings, the assured had been the party to putting forward a
knowingly false case about when the hot works began, was rejected. It was caused by the
legal reasoning which was formulated in the Star Sea case, by which the subsequent lies
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told by the assured, mainly in the proceedings would not amount to concealment of facts
and also would not have had any effect to the ultimate liability of the insurers.

Accordingly, the position of the English marine insurance law in that issues is, in the
absence of the materiality and prejudiced impacts to the ultimate liability of the insurers
regarding the fraudulent acts committed by the assured during the currency of contract,
the post-contractual duty of utmost good faith which gives the remedy of the avoidance
of contract ab initio would not exist.

III.6. Duty of Disclosure and Knowledge of the Assured
Although, in the contract of insurance, particularly marine insurance, the nature of
information is definitely very important. It is caused by the nature of marine insurance
contract in which the unequal of information between the insurer and the assured exists.
At the same time, it is common in the insurance contract transaction where an insurer
relies on the information provided by the assured. It was explained by Wilhelmsen (2000)
the legal reason behind that duty is a question of fairness, in which to evaluate the risk
with less information related to the risk that particularly possessed by the person effecting
insurance would create inequality between the contracting parties. Further, an economic
reason for that duty is to minimise cost to both the insurer and assured. One would realize
that the cost of insurance will be much higher if the insurer should investigate the risk by
himself without support from the obligation of disclosure the material information with
regard to the risk insured. That circumstances had triggered the application of the duty of
disclosure, particularly during negotiation, in the scope of utmost good faith principle.
This duty of disclosure plays a very significant role in order to apply the utmost good
faith principle in the marine insurance contract. Under the English marine insurance law,
such duty is strongly supported to be precisely complied with by the assured. If failing to
comply, the draconian remedy of avoidance the contract would be given to the insurer.
The strong nature of duty to disclose in the context of marine insurance under the English
law can be seen from section 18 of MIA 1906. As stated by the Justice Lloyd J in the case
of

Container Transport International Inc. (CTI) and Reliance Group Inc. v. Oceanus
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Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd (1982), section 18 is an extremely
powerful weapon placed by law in the hands of the insurer.
18 (1)Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the
insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is
known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance
which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured
fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.
18(2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgement of a
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.
18(3)In the absence of inquiry the following circumstance need not be disclosed,
namely:
a. any circumstance which diminish the risk
b.any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The
insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and
matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of business, as such, ought to
know.
c. Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer.
d.Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or
implied warranty.
18(4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or
not is, in each case, a question of fact.
18(5) the term “circumstance” includes any communication made to, or information
received by, the assured.
The duty of disclosure should be performed by the assured before the contract is
concluded. What to be disclosed is about the material information upon which the insurer
would be influence in order to fix premium or take decision whether to accept or refuse
the risks. The information that must be disclosed not only the actual information that is
known by the assured but also the constructive information. It means that the ignorance
of the assured about the information not in his hand or having it partially is unacceptable
if such information is deemed under the notion of ordinary business condition, ought to
be known by the assured. This duty was widely accepted as an active one. How is the
scope of this duty applied in the context of the English marine insurance law and practice,
will be explained below.
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The nature of duty to disclose as mentioned in the section 18 is largely stronger when it is
applied in the case of insurance contract. The case of Schoolman v. Hall (1951) in the
Court of Appeal has formulated the strong nature of duty of disclosure in the burden of
the assured.

The facts
The assured, Mr.Schoolman, a jewellery trader took an insurance cover from the
underwriter, Mr. Hall who was one of the subscribers to a jewellers´ block policy
issued to the assured. The policy was issued after the assured completed the
proposal form provided by the insurer, by which the assured should answer a
number of questions. It was agreed that this form shall be the basis of the contract
of insurance.
In December 1948, the assured´s shop was burgled and the jewellery, valued at
19,976,9 poundsterlings stolen. He then claimed to the insurer under the policy, but
the insurer contended that the policy was void because the assured had not disclosed
his criminal record which occurred 15 years ago to the insurer.

Held by the Court of Appeal that, based on the support of the jury who stipulated that the
non-disclosure of such criminal record was material, so that the insurer may avoid the
contract with the legal reason; although in the proposal form, the assured was only
required to answer certain questions, those questions related to business matters and did
not relieve the assured of his general common law obligation to disclose any further
material facts which might affect the insurer´s mind in accepting the risk. At the same
time, the completion of form has no meaning that the insurer has waived the material
information further in the context of concluding the contract.

That decision had the basis from the case of Glicksman v. Lancashire and General
Assurance Company, Ltd, (1927) by which the Cohen has referred to the legal reason of
the judgement of the Lord Dunedin who said that a contract of insurance is denominated
a contract uberrimae fidei. It is possible for the person to stipulate that answers to certain
questions shall be the basis of the insurance, and if that is done then there is no question
as to materiality left, because the persons have contracted that there should be materiality
in those questions; but quite apart from that, and alongside of that, there is duty of no
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concealment of any consideration which would affect the mind of the ordinary prudent
man in accepting the risk.
Therefore, applying those observations here, while the insurers have stipulated that the
answer to the fifteen questions “shall be the basis of the contract”, that only has the effect
of preventing any argument as to the materiality of those questions should dispute arise.
And the as mentioned above, it does not relieve the assured of his general common law
obligation to disclose any further material facts which might affect the insurer´s mind as
to whether or not he should issue a policy. At the same time, Cohen stated that it is quite
impossible to spell out of the form of the proposal that any agreement by the insurers
exist in order to waive their rights to the general information which the nature of the
contract required.

The decision of Schoolman´s case in the context of duty to disclose above was followed
clearly by the Justice McNair in the case of Roselodge.Ltd.(Formerly “Rose” Diamond
Products, Ltd) v. Castle (1966) . In that case, when the plaintiff (the assured), a diamond
merchants insured their diamonds against all risks with the defendant (the insurer) and
after completing the proposal form in which no question was asked as to previous
convictions of employees. Plaintiff claimed under the policy as a result of R, his principal
director, had been robbed of diamonds worth 304,590,3 poundsterlings on Jan 31, 1965,
by which the claim to the defendants only to pay amount to 73 poundsterlings of the total
amounts insured.

The insurers repudiated the liability based on the ground of the plaintiff ´s failure to
disclose that (1) R, the principal director, had been convicted of bribing a police officer in
1946 and

was fined 75 poundsterlings; (2) M, plaintiff´s sales manager, had been

convicted of smuggling diamonds to the US in 1956, and had been engaged with plaintiff
a year after his release from prison. The plaintiff contended that the facts were not
material and his obligation to disclose was released by the completion of form´s question
provided by the insurer.
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Held by the Justice McNair, inter alia, that (1) that the issue of disclosure was to be
determined by the view of reasonable man; (2) that R´s offence and conviction were not
material facts and need not have been disclosed; (3) that M´s offence and conviction were
material facts which should have been disclosed ; (4) that there was no waiver as between
plaintiff and insurer could be inferred and accordingly, the plaintiff claim failed.

III.6.1. Should Material Rumours be Disclosed ?
Under the regime of English marine insurance law, the notion of material information
that must be disclosed by the assured as well the broker reaches the legal concept of the
material rumours. The recognition of material rumours had been justified based on the
judgement of Elena case (2001) which stipulated that the assured must disclose every
material fact to the risk to be insured including any rumours or reports of which the
insured is aware, so long as the rumours or reports are not “mere speculations, vague
rumours or unreasoned fears”. Before the judgment of Elena case, the legal regime of
material rumours had been used to settle the case of Inversiones Manria S.A. v. Sphere
Drake Insurance Co.Plc., Malvern Insurance Co.Ltd., and Niagara Fire Insurance
Co.Inc., (1989). In that case, the assured committed to non-disclosure act by ignoring the
allegations that the smuggling conducts had been made against members of the crew of
the insured vessel. And then such allegations were proved in fact well-founded, but
remarked. The legal reasons of the Phillips, J´s judgement in the case was the judgement
of an underwriter to placing the risk, not only influenced by the mere facts that can be
shown actually to have affected the risk, but also with the facts that raise doubts as to
risk. In other words, from both cases, the assured must be much aware of the sense of any
material rumours or reports within his knowledge, actual or constructive. Accordingly,
the burden of the assured is much higher with uncertain legal guidance to protect from
the legal conc ept of material rumours disclosure. So any mistake made in respect of that
issue would give the assured the risk without cover, owing to the draconian remedy of
avoiding the contract by the insurer.

Therefore, the life of an assured would be more complicated in the context of duty to
disclose the material rumours if the legal formulation made by the Lord Mansfield, C.J in
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his judgement from the case of Lynch and Jones v. Hamilton (1810) might be applied in
any material rumours case. By which he stated that the non-disclosure of report as to the
insured vessel as having been seen “leaky and deeply laden”, ought to have been
disclosed, although as it turned out, it had been false. It means that it will make no
difference whether the rumours or report is true, accurate or false, as long as such
rumours will raise doubts as to the risk insured, This will be enough to stipulate the
obligation of disclosing such rumours to the insurer.

However, the “endless” burden of the assured in the context of duty to disclose was
relieved from the judgement of Colman, J in the quite recent case of the Gracia Express
(2002). This case had brought back the balance condition of mutual duty to disclose
between the insurer and the assured, in which it seemingly had existed unbalance or
unfair in the scope of material rumours disclosure.

In that case, the assured took war risk insurance from the insurer for his ship. When the
assured claimed for his disappeared ship, the insurer claimed back to avoid the policy
based on the ground that the assured had failed to disclose the facts about some years ago
a yacht owned by him had disappeared suspiciously upon which the allegation of it might
have been cast away existed. The insurer argued that the previous disappeared ship
owned by the assured was material to be disclosed, as the allegation of dishonesty
contained within them was relevant to moral hazard.

It was held by Colman, J that since the assured had proved that the allegation of
dishonesty contained within the facts of previous disappearance to the assured ´s ship was
untrue, so that the insurer was precluded from the remedy of avoidance the contract based
on the basis of non-disclosure (rumours).

The legal reasoning of the Colman, J´s judgement in that case as follows :
Utilizing loss of the opportunity of forming an unfounded suspicion of non-existent
facts in order to avoid paying a loss under policy which, had the truth been made
known to them when they wrote the risk, they would not have hesitated to
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underwrite. To persist in such a course in the face of evidence before the Court that
the suggested facts never existed would, in my judgement, be quite contrary to their
duty of the utmost good faith. Such a course would be so starkly unjust that I would
hold that in such a case it would be unconscionable for the Court to permit the
insurers to avoid the policy on the ground of non-disclosure.
Although the decision of this case was contrary to the precedent and created a great deal
of criticism on it, Colman, J´s judgement is legitimate and reasonable legal basis by
stating that it is truly true, a prudent insurer would not take account of a matter which
could not possibly be true when forming his judgment upon the acceptance of insurance
contract.

III.6.2. Duty of Disclosure Test
According to the Justice MacKenna from his judgement in the case of Lambert v. Cooperative Insurance Society, Ltd. (1975) described the formulation of the four test of duty
to disclosure : first, the duty is to disclose such facts only as the particular assured
believes to be material; secondly, it is to disclose such facts as a reasonable man would
believe to be material; thirdly, it is to disclose such facts as the particular insurer would
regard as material; fourthly, it is to disclose such facts as a reasonable or prudent insurer
might have treated as material.

The first test of duty to disclose had been rejected by the decision of the Lord Blackburn
in the case of Brownile v. Campbell (1820) by stipulating that there is an obligation there
to disclose what you know, and the concealment of a material circumstance known to you
whether you thought it material or not, avoids the policy.

III.6.3. Reasonable Man or Reasonable Insurer Test ?
The legal concept of the reasonable man, the second test, mentioned in the decision as
mentioned by the Justice McNair in the Roselodge´s case was formulated based on the
judgment of the Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in the case of Joel v. Law Union and
Crown Insurance Company (1908) who stated that if reasonable person would know that
underwriters would naturally be influenced, in deciding whether to accept the risk and
what premiums to charge, by those circumstance, the fact that they were kept in
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ignorance of them and indeed, were misled, is fatal to the assured´s claim. Later, he
added that the obligation to disclose, therefore, necessarily depends on the knowledge
you posses. Your opinion of the materiality of that knowledge is of no moment. If a
reasonable man would have recognized that it was material to disclose the knowledge in
question, it is no excuse that you did not recognize it to be so.

However if the fact, though material, is one which he did not and could not have been
expected to know in the particular circumstances, or if its materiality would not have
been apparent to a reasonable man, his failure to disclose it is not a breach of duty. For
example, if the ordinary man would not inferred a serious malady from a headache,
knowledge of malady can not be proved.

In other words, he agreed that it was not enough for the applicant to tell the insured what
he thought was material. There is further duty that he should do it to the extent that a
reasonable man would have done it. The disclosure must be of all you ought to have
realized to be material, not of that only which you did in fact realize to be so.

In the case of Becker v. Marshall (1922), the regime of second test in the duty of
disclosure was affirmed definitely by the Justice Salter who said that a policy against
burglary was avoided, because of the assured´s failure to disclose three matters : previous
burglary, his foreign origin, and a change of his name, which under the perspective of
average reasonable man would have disclosed and would have known that it was
necessary to disclose. When this case appealed in the Court of Appeal, Lord Sterndale
confirmed that he will accept for the purposes of the judgement that material should be
interpreted in the view of a reasonable man.

Nevertheless, the test of reasonable man was not purely used under the Moulton´s test in
the Joel´s case, if examining carefully his judgement, the notion of fourth test existed. It
can be seen from the statement of him who stated that :
“….if an ordinary person taking reasonable care and using reasonable judgement,
would not know all the facts, if for example, he would not know that a particular
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symptom indicated the presence of a serious malady, he is under no duty to state
that he had the symptom, because all the material facts would not be within his
knowledge. But they were within his knowledge, or if they would be within the
knowledge of an ordinary reasonable person, then….he must disclose them if they
would naturally influence a reasonable underwriter”.
The words of “…he must disclose them if they would naturally influence a reasonable
underwriter” fall under the fourth test of duty to disclose. This test has been developed by
the Justice Blackburn, in the case of Ionides and Another v. Pender (1872) said that all
should be disclosed which would affect the judgement of a rational underwriter
governing himself by the principles and calculations on which underwriters do in practice
act.

The concept of reasonable insurer test has also played very significant role in the case of
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Ontario Metal Products Co. Ltd (1925), a
Canadian case, in which the Privy Council stipulated that it is a question of fact in each
case whether if the matters concealed or misrepresented had been truly disclosed they
would, on a fair consideration of the evidence, have influenced a reasonable insurer to
decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher premium.

In addition, the judgement of the Justice Megaw in the case of Anglo-African Merchants
Ltd. and Another v. Bayley and Others (1969) clarifies the existence of both second and
fourth test which were applied in the English marine insurance law relating to the case of
duty of disclosure. In that case, the Justice Megaw stated that :

If, however, the assured knew of facts, and if as a reasonable man he should have
realised that knowledge of those facts might be, regarded as material by a normal
prudent underwriter, then if those facts are not disclosed and if they would have
been material, the defence of non-disclosure prevails.
Nevertheless, the application of the fourth test of duty to disclose, which is similar to
section 18 (2) of MIA 1906, later has gained largely strong supports when it comes to the
concept of materiality test and inducement.
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III.6.4. Test of Materiality and Inducement
The notion of duty to disclose the material information falls under the basis of judgement
both the test of reasonable man and the reasonable or prudent insurer as mentioned
clearly above. However, in the subsequent condition, the test of prudent insurer was
chosen mainly to be applied, particularly when we discuss about the limit of materiality
of any information informed in the making of insurance contract. The prudent insurer
test, in the context of marine insurance specifically, has been derived from section 18 (2)
of the MIA 1906 which stipulated that information is material if it would influence the
judgement of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will
take the risk.

Thomas (1996) stated that, under the context of English marine insurance law, the test of
materiality is an objective one. It means that the basis of judgement for materiality test is
the reaction of the hypothetical prudent insurer, not that of the actual insurer which is of
relevance. Accordingly, the assured is protected from the potential subjective
capriciousness and idiosyncrasies of the actual underwriter, whose professional ways
may be uncertain, variable, and impossible to predict. The reaction of a prudent insurer
should be measured on a case by case basis by the expert evidence provided by expert
witness in the relevant insurance market. The negative meaning of those proposition is
the first test of duty to disclose as mentioned above, is inapplicable.

The supporting case for the materiality test from the prudent insurer perspective can be
seen from the case of Container Transport International Inc. (CTI) and Reliance Group
Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. (1982). In that case,
the plaintiff, CTI, placed the insurance cover for container damage with C.E. Heath and
Co represented by the Mr. Fleetwood and other syndicates at Lloyd´s underwriters
commencing on June 1, 1975. Before placing insurance cover with those underwriters,
CTI had placed its insurance with the Crum & Foster; it was over as
disagreement about the terms upon which the CTI found unacceptable.

52

matters of

With some reasons, the underwriters at Lloyd´s would not renew beyond Dec 1, 1976 and
in due course the insurance was placed with the defendants Oceanus. It was common
ground that Oceanus were shown the Lloyd´s experience for the year June, 1975 to May,
1976, plus the month of June 1976 prepared by the plaintiff´s broker including a telex
dated September 10, 1976 described the Lloyd´s experience from years to June 1,1976 ,
together with the losses which would have incurred. On December 1, 1976, the Oceanus
came on risk.

On December 2, 1977 Oceanus declined to pay any further claims by the assured and
pending investigation. The plaintiff CTI demanded payments of their claims for August
to October 1977 and issued their writ on March 1, 1978. Fifteen days after, Oceanus
wrote avoiding the policy of the assured based on the ground of misrepresentation and
non-disclosure contending that : (1) CTI had put forward an inaccurate or incomplete and
misleading claims record; (2) that they had failed to disclose a refusal by underwriters to
renew. Then by further amendment it was alleged that the assured had failed to make full
disclosure when obtaining insurance at Lloyd´s for the period of June 1975 to November
1976 and the Lloyd´s policy was avoidable.

It was held by the Justice Lloyd, inter alia, that :
1. For the issue (2 ) about the refusal to renew, said that the submission by Oceanus that
the non-disclosure of the Crum & Forster figures for the previous years was a
material factor would be rejected in that the evidence was insufficient to support an
allegation of non-disclosure; even if it had been material, on the facts, Oceanus had
waived information as to that experience by making clear to Mr. Fleetwood their
decision to work on the telex of September 10,1976.
2. For the issue (1), the submission of incomplete figure was rejected since Oceanus
could have seen the claims figures for the months June, 1975 to May 1976 from the
documents they had in their possession when the risk was placed. Premium figures
that Oceanus did not have were not a matter in the perspective of the court.
3. The submission that CTI ought to have disclose to Oceanus that they had failed to
make full disclosure to Lloyd´s would also be rejected based on the facts that neither
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CTI nor Mr. Fleetwood were guilty of any non-disclosure at any stage and the
Lloyd´s insurance was never voidab le on that or any other ground.

In other words, from the other statement made by the Justice Lloyd in the same case, who
states the insurer would not be succeed to proceed a defence of non-disclosure if the
insurer could not satisfy the court by evidence or otherwise that a prudent insurer if he
had known the facts in question would have declined the risk altogether or charged higher
premium.

From the Lloyd´s statements above, there is clear meaning that the nature of materiality
test in the context of non-disclosure has recognized the existence of inducement. Or it can
be said that any material non-disclosure should be proved to induce the prudent insurer in
his judgement to place the risk in order to make the insurer gaining the benefit of
avoidance remedy under section 18 of MIA 1906. However, the test of inducement
shown by the “influence” of section 18, is formulated as a non-decisive one. It does not
have a meaning that the inducement makes as to his final state of mind of the judgement
of the prudent underwriter as so expressed in the decision of placing the risk.

It seems fair for the assured as a shield of protection from the strong weapon of defence
owned by the insurer in the section 18, that the word “influence” was “non-decisive
influence”. The legal formulation of the non-decisive influence test and the causal
connection between non-disclosure and the making of the contract of marine insurance
has

gained very strong support from the decision of further case of Pan Atlantic

Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd.(1993). This case was
quite special based on the reason of this a kind of reinsurance contract dispute, and its
nature of case was much similar to the case of CTI above. In his judgement in the Court
of Appeal for that case, Steyn, L.J., in no doubt adopted the legal formulation made in the
case of CTI by establishing the judgement based on the ground that the avoidance for
non-disclosure is the remedy provided by law because the risk presented is different from
the true risk. In the words of Lord Mansfield in the case of Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3
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Burr. 1905 described the effect of non-disclosure as to induce him to estimate the risk as
if it did not exist.

The basis of reason chosen by the Steyn, L.J. differed from the legal concept which
explained that a fact is material if a prudent insurer would have wished to be aware of it
in reaching his decision. The previous test which is similar to the Lord Mansfield´s
formula would make the insurer more difficult to prove the existence of increased risk in
the presence of material non-disclosure. Such test also would protect the assured as well
as the broker from disclosing the endless material information about the assured´s past.

The Court of Appeal´s judgement in the case of Pan Atlantic was upheld by the House of
Lords through the concise judgement of Lord Mustill that “if the… non-disclosure of a
material fact did not in fact induce the making of the contract (in the sense in which the
expression is used in the general law of misrepresentation), the underwriter is not entitled
to rely on it as a ground for avoiding the contract”.(Thomas, 1996).

In addition, in the issue of non-decisive influence, the Lord Mustill also stated that it has
the meaning of the “right to know” test. The notion of fairness in this formulation is it
would make the less burden of the assured to perform the duty of disclosure and at the
same time, it restricts the right of the insurer to avoid the contract under the section 18 of
MIA 1906.
III.7. Misrepresentation
Unlike the law of misrepresentation in the context of general contract law, which gives
the injured party the range of remedies based on the nature of the misrepresentation itself,
the law of misrepresentation under the regime of English marine insurance law,
particularly section 20 of MIA 1906, gives only draconian remedy if the assured as well
the broker breach any material representation to the insurer before the contract is
concluded or during the period of negotiation. It makes no difference whether such
breach of material representation is innocent, negligent or fraudulent, the remedy to avoid
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the contract ab initio will prevail. The legal basis for the claim to avoid contract is the
proof of representation made by the assured or broker was untrue.

Practically, the notion of misrepresentation is precisely difficult to differentiate with the
non-disclosure. Both relatively resembles. Conceptually speaking, the fundamental
distinction between them is for a duty to disclose is an obligation to merely disclose
material information, and representation means that an obligation to ensure that any
information volunteered is truthful and accurate. Therefore, it is not surprise when
recognizing the legal concept under the English law if the fact of one conducts a partial
non-disclosure might be categorized as a misrepresentation.

Accordingly, the issue of materiality in the sense of representation will be treated similar
to the duty of disclosure, upon which the representation is material if it would influence
the judgement of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will
take the risk. It has legal impact similarly to the treatment in the duty to disclose, by
which the test of materiality has to be measured under the basis of a prudent insurer by
questioning the existence of the material misrepresentation whether having induced the
insurer to place the risk or not. This test is an objective approach as mentioned in the sub
section of duty of disclosure above.

The case of Pan Atlantic, again, had become very good example for the legal formulation
above, through the decision made by the House of Lords which stated that no remedy of
avoidance of a contract for the insurer unless he could prove that such material
misrepresentation induced the prudent insurer in respect of the making of the contract.

However, the inducement theory will not be practicable legally to pinpoint the remedy of
avoidance if the insurer waive the inducement as mentioned in the general concept of
contract law. So, in order to make it practicable legally in the context of
misrepresentation, one should show that the representee relies on the misrepresentation
made by the representor. In other words, if there is no reliance on the fact of a material
misrepresentation, the insurer could not avoid the contract. That circumstance has its
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legal basis on the judgement of Lord Mustill in the same case, Pan Atlantic, by saying
that to enable an underwriter to escape liability when he has suffered no harm, would be
positively unjust and contrary to the spirit of mutual good faith recognised by section 17
of MIA 1906. Whether a particular representation be material or not is in each case, a
question of fact.

In addition, under the English marine insurance law, a representation is either a
representation as to matter of fact, or as to a matter of expectation or belief. Therefore, a
representation as to a matter of fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is to say, if
the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not be
considered material by a prudent insurer.

For the issue of representation of expectation or belief, those are true if it is made in good
faith. However, from the author´s point of view, the statement above need to be clarified
as to whether the mere good faith duty will prevail in the scope of representation of the
expectation or belief, or in the notion of duty of care under the regime of general tort law.
In tort law, a representation of expectation or belief shall be measured based upon the
ground of negligent acts by which such negligent acts was conducted by the person who
has a skill and or special knowledge in respect of making a representation of expectation
or belief.

Unlike the nature of non-disclosure, a misrepresentation may be withdrawn or corrected
before the contract is concluded.

III.8. Broker´s Role
In the context of marine insurance transaction, the insurance broker plays a very
significant role. It is very rare to place marine insurance risk without the role of the
marine insurance broker. Considering that nature, section 19 of the Marine Insurance Act
1906 stipulated that, subject to other section stipulated in the large section of utmost good
faith duty in the marine insurance law, where an insurance is effected for the assured by
an agent, the agent must disclose to the insurer :
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1. every material circumstance which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is
deemed to know every circumstance which in the ordinary course of business ought
to be known by, or to have been communicated to him, and;
2. every material circumstance which the assured is bound to disclose, unless it come to
his knowledge too late to communicate it to the agent.

The word “agent” as mentioned above implies a different meaning with the term
“broker”. It seems difficult to differentiate, but broker is a kind of agent in the context of
agency law. The word “broker” has the specific meaning to show an agent is employed
primarily to negotiate contract between two parties (Beatson, 2002). In addition, it is
simply defined as to show the general term of fiduciary relationship between the principal
and agent upon which the agent should acts on behalf of the name and the interest of a
principal. Relating to the difference, Parks (1988) states that when talking about marine
insurance, brokers mean a person is commonly employed by the assured who seeking
insurance.

Nevertheless, the term “agent” also resembles the meaning of Parks´ definition in the
context of the opinion of the Lord Harlsbury in the case of Blackburn v. Vigors (1887) by
saying that “some agents, so far represent the principal the principal that in all respects
their acts and intentions and their knowledge may truly be said to be the acts and
intentions and knowledge of the principal”.

Section 19 stipulates clearly the meaning of agent in it as a person who is employed by
the assured in order seek an insurance cover. In the words of Merkin (1996) who said that
an insurance broker is an independent intermediary who owes parallel duties of care in
contract and tort to his client, the assured, and that broker´s duty is owed to the assured
and not to the insurer or any third party. However, in the practice of marine insurance
business, the pure meaning of an agent is to serve the interests of the assured only, did
not exist any longer. As affirmed by the Ratnayeke (1992) that due to the present
commercial requirements the broker seems to be acting as agent of the insurer as well as
the assured with regard to the different of the agreement in a marine insurance contract.
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Therefore, up to what extent the broker´s responsibility to both assured and insurer is a
question fact.

In addition, there are other three common types of condition in an agency relationship in
the context of marine insurance, explained by the Merkin (1996) as follows : (1) the
underwriting agent, an independent company appointed by one or more insurers to
receive proposal from the brokers and to take underwriting decisions on behalf of the
insurers; (2) the Lloyd´s line slip, by means of this device, an underwriter may be given
authority by other underwriters to accept the risk on their behalves as well as on his
behalf. So that a broker who procures the signature of the leading underwriter will
automatically obtain a substantial proportion of the total subscription required; (3) the
broker acting under a binding authority or “binder”. A binder means a contract between
an insurer and a broker delegating certain underwriting power through conferring a right
to accept risks of a given description and under given financial limit.

III.8.1. Broker´s Role and Utmost Good Faith Duty
One significant role of an insurance broker is to negotiate the proposed cover with the
insurer in the pre-contractual stage. In this context, the insurance broker should disclose
actual knowledge as well his constructive knowledge which is known by the broker, and
also any material information that the assured is bound to disclose. The notion of duty to
disclose and representation owed by the broker is precisely similar to the assured. No
prohibition is imposed to the insurer for claiming to avoid the contract as a result of the
broker breach of the duty of utmost good faith. Furthermore, the insurance broker may
be liable to damages to the insurer if the broker failed to disclose every material
circumstance as mentioned in section 19 of MIA 1906. It was clarified from the case of
Wolcott v. Excess Insurance (1978) in which it was held that the broker was liable to
indemnify the defendant insurer with regard to the money that had to be given to the
plaintiff assured as a result of failing to convey information to the insurer, who was his
principal.
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Accordingly, in the pure sense when broker is an agent of the assured only or to the
insurer, situation seems simpler to determine to whom broker is responsible.

The

situation becomes more complicated when a broker is responsible in different nature for
both the assured and the insurer. As described in the context of binder circumstances
when the broker is the agent of the insurer in operating the binder but he is also the agent
of the assured whose risks he declared to the binder. This nature of binder will be divided
into two categories : first, obligatory binder when a broker, on accepting a risk, makes an
appropriate declaration to the insurer, confirming that the risk has been allocated to the
binder; secondly, non-obligatory binder when a broker does not confer on the final power
to accept risks but merely to receive them and to seek confirmation of acceptance by the
insurer.

Therefore, for the question of the first category, whether the broker owes duty of care to
the insurer in making declaration under the obligatory binder was answered by the
judgement of Kennedy, J in the case of Empress Assurance Corporation Ltd v. Bowring
& Co.Ltd (1905). In that case the broker had in good faith made reinsurance declarations
which contained false information regarding the premium paid to the reassured. The
insurer then claimed for breach of good faith duty. It was held by him that there was no
duty of care to the reinsurer, although the broker had administered the binder on behalf of
the reinsurer. The broker remained the agent of the reassured. It was also held that by
appointing as his agent a broker who owes the primary duties to the assured, the insurer
must be taken to have waived any cause of action against the broker for furthering the
interest of the assured. The notion of waiver taken by the insurer in this circumstance also
would apply to the situation when the assured made full disclosure to broker, but broker
did not communicate to the insurer. Kennedy believed that in the absence of fraudulent
acts, the response of insurer as to that situation is either waived disclosure or was deemed
to receive the information, The legal formulation established by the Empress case, has
been followed in the judgement of the White v. Jones case (1995), which permitted the
intermediary agent, such as the insurance broker, to undertake contractual responsibilities
to A and tortuous responsibilities to B, with a condition that no conflict of interest
existed.
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However, under non-obligatory binder, the case of Berger and Light Diffusers Pty. Ltd v.
Pollock (1973) stipulated that in respect of making a declaration, if the assured has failed
to disclose all material facts to the broker, the insurer clearly has the right to avoid that
particular declaration.

The situation of the assured-broker relationship seems to be unfortunate to the assured´s
interest when it comes to the context of the broker´s liability to the assured. It was
derived from the non-recognition of the English court to justify the liability on the broker
for breach of his contractual duty by not to observe the utmost good faith to the insurer.
The court rejected to the liability on the broker when he failed to inform the assured of
the latter´s duty of disclosure. The legal reason for that was if it was accepted, it would
amount to requiring brokers to advise their client´s on the law, unless the factual situation
demands that a broker informs his client as to the broad requirements of
insurance(Ratnayeke, 1992).

III.8.2. Knowledge of the Broker
It was identified by Ratnayeke (1992) that in the context of an agency relating to nondisclosure, most problems arise where the agent´s knowledge is imputed to the principal.
This issue of imputation of the agent´s knowledge to the principal is mainly related to the
application of section 18 (1) upon which the assured is bound to disclose any material
facts which is ought to be known by him in the ordinary course of business.

The necessity of that issue of the imputation has gained the justification from the courts
through the several key rules below :

1. Where a loss must fall on one of two innocent parties through the fraud or negligence
of a third party it must be borne by the party who employed and trusted the third
person.
2. The ability of the principal to misuse the knowledge of the agent to his advantage.
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3. The assumption of the insurer when entering into the agreement that all material facts
connected with the property insured, known to the agent employed for that purpose,
have been by him communicated to his principal.

The rules of imputation above has the objective to maintain the application of utmost
good faith which is not reduced by the implementation of the agency law to the marine
insurance law.

Relating to the issue of imputation as mentioned in section 19, the judgement of the Lord
Macnagthen in the case of Blackburn v. Vigors (1886) which stated that the agent did not
carry out the transaction and the facts that he had previously been employed did not
impute the knowledge to the principal for all purposes. In other words, as long as the
agent is not a person to whom the assured needs to effect the insurance policy, the
knowledge of the agent is not imputed to the principal (the assured). This judgement had
been affirmed by the settlement of the case of PCW Syndicates v. PCW Reinsurers (1996)
upon which the Waller J decided that the claim of the reinsurers to repudiate the contract
was rejected because the knowledge of PCW Syndicates as to their dishonesty was not
held in their capacity as agent (effecting insurance) for the insurers, PCW was an
underwriting agents/intermediary agents, and therefore there was no obligation to
disclose such dishonest conduct.

Nevertheless, Waller J added that the insurance contract would be vitiated by
concealment on the part of the agent just as it would be by concealment on the part of the
principal. But that is not because the knowledge of the agent is to be imputed to principal,
but because the agent of the assured is bound as principal is bound to communicate to the
underwriters, all material facts within his knowledge.

Therefore, the situation in respect of imputation issue and concealment which lead to the
dishonesty of the agent seems more challenging when questioning whether the obligation
to disclose on an agent instructed to effect insurance, would have applied to the facts that
revealed a fraud by the agent on his principal. The answer is no liability would be
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attached to the assured. That answer was supported by the judgement of the Devlin J in
the case of Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd. (1954). In that case, in
which his agent did fraudulent misrepresentation, he stated that :
A principal is thus liable for a false misrepresentation made fraudulently if the agent
is acting within the scope of his authority actual or apparent, but if the chain is
innocent principal, dishonesty agent, innocent agent and if dishonesty is directed at
principal, then since knowledge can not attributed to the principal, the principal is
not liable for fraudulent misstatement.

The next critical issue of knowledge of the assured in the English marine insurance law is
about the non-disclosure of the employee working in the broker firm. In the beginning,
the legal formulation for that issue was quite restricted through the judgement in the case
of Stewart v. Dunlop (Ratnayeke, 1992) which stated as follows :
It is certainly the duty of a clerk to disclose to his employer whatever information
he receives in regard to the latter´s business and it is submitted that the employer is
responsible for not disclosing a fact which was within the knowledge of his clerk.

It seems that no matter what the particular relationship and its nature take place, the
broker should be liable for such non-disclosure. This judgement would cause some
difficulties for the big insurance broker who has a complicated structure of organisation
with many lines of duty and authority. However, in the twentieth century, the legal
formulation was revised by the judgement of Mahli v. Abbey Life Assurance Co.Ltd
(Merkin, 1996). In that case, there was material facts in respect of the assured possessed
by the underwriting department of the defendant insurer following its rejection of a
proposal. Such facts failed to be submitted to the general administration of the insurer.
Accordingly, the insurer keeps collecting premiums on earlier policy which could
precisely be deemed to have been procured by misrepresentation and non-disclosure. It
was held by the Court of Appeal that the facts known to the underwriting department
could not be imputed to the rest of the company. Therefore, the premium collections by
the insurer did not mean to the waiver of the assured´s breach of duty. In other words, an
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imputed interchange information between the various department of the broking
organisation is not recognised legally.

In addition, the law of insurance under English jurisdiction seems quite fair not to
impose very strict to the context of non-disclosure related to the involvement of agent
when effecting insurance, as stipulated in the case of Roberts V. Plaisted (1989). In that
case, the circumstances existed when the broker had visited the subject matter of
insurance cover and after making a judgement on it he filled out the proposal form by
himself. In which then, the assured had to responsible for non-disclosure of a
circumstance which was alleged to be material by the insurer. The court rejected that
claim and found the judgement in favour of the assured.

III.9. Utmost Good Faith Duty to the Third Party
In the context of the duty of insurer to observe the utmost good faith towards the third
party´s interest of insurance cover under the assignment scheme, the English court took a
position not to recognize it. This position had been derived from the judgement of the
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (TheGood
Luck) case in 1989. In that case, a plaintiff bank was a mortgagee of the ship owned by
the shipowner as the mortgagor. The mortgagee´s interest had been insured by the owner,
and the assigned it to the plaintiff bank. When the ship was struck by missile while in the
prohibited area, upon which the special arrangement had to be made, but the defendants
(insurer) refused to compensate the loss with the reason that conditions of the agreement
had been violated by the owner, assignor of the cover. As a result of that refusal, plaintiff
bank claimed compensation to the defendants. Plaintiff had reasoned that based on the
assignment of the beneficial interest, the defendant owed of the utmost good faith duty to
the plaintiff, that they were in breach of it. The breach of utmost good faith duty
arguments was rejected by the Justice Hobhouse by stating that the assignee of the
benefits of such an insurance contract does not owe any duty of the utmost good faith to
the insurer nor on the basis of mutuality is there. The insurer´s duty of the utmost good
faith was only to the shipowner.
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Therefore, for the mortgagee, that judgement would make him to be very careful in near
future when deals with the cover of the mortgagee´s interest. A safeguard clause
specifically has to be included to protect his interests properly.
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CHAPTER IV
LEGAL CRITICISM ON THE UTMOST GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE

IV.1. Uncertainty of the Prudent Insurer Test
Knowledge of the assured as well the broker is the basis to activate the duty to disclose
upon which the breach of it can be claimed as non-disclosure of material information.
The English marine insurance law imposes high standard to the issue of the knowledge
by stipulating that knowledge covers actual and constructive knowledge. In other words,
there will be a presumption of knowledge which must be known by the assured under the
limit of ordinary course of his business. When it relates to the test of materiality, by
which the prudent insurer approach will prevail, also known as the objective approach, its
legal formulation in fact would result in greater difficulty in assessing the standard of
constructive knowledge by which to judge the information which ought to be disclosed to
the insurer and would result in a greater degree of uncertainty.

Such difficult and uncertain circumstance caused by the benchmark of a “prudent
insurer” is relatively easy to fix as compared with the complexities arising out of the
“prudent assured” approach who could vary

as widely as possible from the small

exporter or importer to the giant ship owning company and shippers. That makes the
marine insurance industry continuing to be troubled by the concept of the “prudent
insurer”.(Derrington, 1998).

Therefore, in the context of effecting insurance cover by the person who does not have
special knowledge relating to the subject-matters, such as occurred in the case of HIH
Casualty and General Insurance Ltd and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others
(2001) where the assured, banking firms, have less special knowledge to the subjectmatters of financing the film productions. The regime of a prudent insurer to be disclosed
actual knowledge as well as constructive knowledge tends to create a weaker legal
protection in the hand of the assured.

It is more complicated if relating this issue with

the application of active duty of disclosure to the English marine insurance law, upon
which the duty to assess what information is material for the insurer rests with the person
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effecting the insurance, as mentioned in the Lambert and Schoolman cases. In other
words, the burden to disclose does not stop when all material questions in the proposed
form have been answered correctly by the person effecting insurance.

In addition, it is very unclear how to precisely interpret the legal concept of the “prudent
insurer”. Diamond (1996) stated that if we go to the Lloyd´s Office and asking some
questions relating to the placing the risks, one would find in not so difficult way that
there are only few prudent insurers, even if it is possible for us to show that some insurers
are not prudent ones at all. From the business point of view, it is not uncommon when
some underwriters have an occasion to write “loss leaders” knowing that the business
will be unprofitable and in the hope of getting an entree into a particular line of business
in the future.

A prudent insurer test also faces difficulty to define the scope of information that need
not to be disclosed to an underwriter, owing to the variety of expertise among the
underwriters themselves. For example, fertilizers which have tendency to “cake” on
exposure and moisture, a relevant factor in the level of risk involved in its carriage of
goods. Such fact could be understood firmly by the insurer who is a specialist in those
matters, but perhaps not to the other underwriters which has not.

The prudent test in the context of utmost good faith had been revised by another common
law system, Australia marine insurance law. It was stipulated by the Insurance Contract
Act 1984 with formulating legal rule with regard to the duty of disclosure as follows :
Section 21 (1) Subject to this Act, an insured has a duty to disclose to the insurer,
before the relevant contract of insurance is entered into, every matter that is known
to the insured, being a matter that : (a) the insured knows to be a matter relevant to
the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms; or
(b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be a
matter so relevant.
Section 26 (2) A statement that was made by a person in connection with a
proposed contract of insurance shall not be taken to be a misrepresentation unless
the person who made the statement knew, or a reasonable person in the
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circumstances could be expected to have known, that the statement would have
been relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk and, if so, on
what terms.

As stated in the rules above, the Australian marine insurance law has taken an approach
of the reasonable assured by stipulating that the test of materiality would be measured
based on the reasonable person test, instead of the prudent insurer. In addition, section 21
(3) of the Insurance Contract Act also states that where a person has failed to answer or
given an obviously incomplete or irrelevant answer to a question included in a proposal
form, the insurer is deemed to have waived compliance with the duty of disclosure in
relation to the matter.

Furthermore, section 21 (3) was felt too generous for the insurer´s benefit, upon which it
placed too onerous burden on an assured to assess what matters are relevant to decision
of the insurer when accepting the risks. Therefore, through Insurance Laws Amendment
Act 1998 which came into effect on 1 September 1999, section 21 (3) has been replaced
by a new section 21 A, which demands an insurer to pose specific questions to an
assured that are relevant to the risk and to request expressly that the insured disclose each
“exceptional circumstances”, which is known to the insured, and which the insured
knows. Where the insured properly answers these questions the insured is deemed to have
complied with the duty of disclosure.

IV.2. Legal Problems of the Actual Inducement
The notion of presumption of the inducement in the scope of non-disclosure that should
be showed by the judgement of the Pan Atlantic is not free from the legal problems which
are necessary to be clarified. As to the problem of doubt regarding which party bears the
burden of proof in regard to the inducement. For the assured, it is very difficult to
produce evidence in order to prove that the insurer was not actually induced into making
the contract. In the issue of evidentiary problem, as stated by the Justice Byrne from the
Australian marine insurance case, Akedian (1997) by which he referred to the difficulty
of the court evaluating the evidence of insurers that they were induced.
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Whether one calls it a presumption of fact or a matter of inference, there is a very
short step between conclusion that the mind of a prudent underwriter would be
affected by a matter and the further conclusion that this underwriter before the was
so induced. This more difficult in the case of non-disclosure because the question
can not be that these insurers were induced to issue the policy in question by
something they were ignorant; it must be that they would not have issued the policy
if they had been aware of the non-disclosed fact.

The legal formulation made by the Justice Byrne above, seems to be similar to the
statement of the Lord Mustill in the case of Pan Atlantic who said that referring to a
presumption of inducement, which would go against the general law of inducement upon
which ruled that no inducement existed when the induced party was waived that
inducement with regard of the subject-matters insured.

Furthermore, the practice of marine insurance is mostly conducted under the principle of
spreading risk. That principle will be realized in the form of signing a slip provided by
the assured or his broker. Meaning that in one insurance cover held by the assured, the
insurer who agreed to indemnify the risk is more than 2 insurers, not uncommon if that
insurers reach more than ten insurers. So then the issue of inducement in the context of
non-disclosure particularly, has no effect if not, less effect of inducement to the nonleading underwriters as a result of non-leading underwriters will merely refer to the
judgement of risk made by the leading underwriter. Accordingly, the nature of fairness
will not be maintained if non-leading underwriters are given the right to avoid the
contract based on the ground of actual inducement not made to them.

IV.3. Unfairness of A Single Remedy ?
The uncertainty of a prudent insurer test, difficulty in applying the actual inducement,
true is not necessary in material disclosure, and broad meaning of active duty of
disclosure have been colouring negatively the character of the English marine insurance
law. In addition, the nature of no gravity of fault has added the problems to the assured
to get fair treatment legally and a shield of protection from bad faith and bad underwriting made by the insurer with regard of the marine insurance policy. The fact
that an underwriter may have a bad faith to escape from his liability, clearly could

69

happen. The case of Alfred McAlpine v. BAI (Run-off) (2000) justifies such condition. In
the light of that case, Yeo (2002) states that “there was clear indication of bad faith on the
part of the insurer – sloppiness in contract drafting, evasiveness in claim handling and
general lack of cooperation. Yet BAI, the insurer, was the one to cry foul, turns the
tables round and allege that the insured was the one in breach of utmost good faith. The
insurer has unapologetically drawn a very tenuous line between over-reliance on and
abuse of the good faith defence”.

Another critical legal formulation for those who effecting insurance in the English
jurisdiction is the most extreme remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the
utmost good faith principle. This remedy applies to the pre-contractual stage as well as
post-contract time. A fairness of remedy in the context of utmost good faith breach based
on the case by case judgment has not been perceived by the English law and practice. As
stated by Eggers (2001) this remedy does not allow for the justice of the case. He added
also that the court discretion to make it more flexible has not got the basis from referring
to no reported cases of allowing court discretion to make another fair remedy in the
context of the breach of the utmost good faith duty. Actually, the nature of more flexible
remedy has been raised personally by the Lord Hobhouse in the case of The Star Sea,
particularly when discussing about the post-contract stage of utmost good faith duty.

An evitable consequence in the post-contract situation is that remedy of avoidance
of the contract is impractical terms wholly one-sided. It is a remedy of a value to the
insurer and, if the defendants´ argument is accepted, of disproportionate benefit to
him; it enables him to escape retrospectively the liability to indemnify which he has
previously and validly undertaken. Save possibly for some types of reinsurance
treaty, it is hard to think of circumstances where an assured will stand to benefit
from the avoidance of the policy for something that has occurred after the contract
has been entered into.

Unfortunately, the legal formulation taken by Lord Hobhouse was not a majority voice of
legal judgement in the context of utmost good faith duty in the English marine insurance
law. Most of them, still believe that the remedy of avoidance has been chosen rigidly as a
“proper” remedy to give the “injured” party a right to avoid contract.
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IV.4. Practice in the Other Jurisdictions
Having said that the regime of sanction in the English marine insurance law with regard
to breaching the utmost good faith duty, it has become the strictest and draconian one in
the terms of not allowing other remedies than rescission. While it is compared to other
European countries. As cited in the Norway, under the Norwegian Marine Insurance
Plan 1996 Chapter 3. The primary legal basis has been formulated in this plan is the
remedy of avoidance and other remedies will be given based on the gravity of fault. It
also stipulates that only fraudulent acts as well as non-disclosure that assumed the insurer
would not have accepted the risk if had been disclosed can give the right to the insurer
claiming to avoid contract. Or he may cancel the other insurance contracts he has with the
person effecting insurance by giving fourteen days notice. In addition, if it must be
assumed that the insurer would have accepted but on other condition, he shall only be
liable to the extent that it is proved that the loss is not attributable to such circumstances
as the person effecting insurance should have disclose. For the post-contract duty, the
plan stated that the liability is limited in the same manner if the person effecting
insurance has been in breach of the duty of disclosure after the contract was concluded,
unless it has been proved that the loss occurred before the person effecting insurance was
able to correct the information supplied by him.

Furthermore, Wilhemsen (2000) explains that such legal formulations affirmed the
alternative sanction in the context of the Norwegian Plan in which the insurer has
freedom of liability for incurred casualties. Or, in the context of both circumstances, the
insurer may cancel the contract prospectively, not to avoid the contract retrospectively.
She also added that the other alternative of remedy is recognised in the Norwegian cargo
clause in the form of reduction in indemnity according to the evaluation based on the
influence of the undisclosed information on the insurance contract and the casualty, the
degree of fault or other circumstances.

In specific, when it comes to the rule the innocent breach of utmost good faith duty, it
was held that if the person effecting insurance has given the incorrect or incomplete
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information without any blame attached to him, the insurer is liable as if the correct
information has been given to him, or the insurer may cancel the contract by giving
fourteen days´ notice. In other word, breach of duty in good faith will make the insurer
fully liable for the incurred casualties.

One more difference between the English marine insurance law and the Norwegian
Marine Insurance Plan is the explicit prohibition in the plan for the insurer to claim for
avoiding or cancel the contract if he failed to notify the assured the incorrect or
incomplete information has been given to him in respect of effecting insurance. This rule
will solve the problem of balance of duty between the assured and the insurer, by which
in the English insurance case such as Banque Finaciere case, proved the unbalance of
duty in the application of section 17-20 of MIA 1906.

In another European country, Wilhemsen (2000) again said that French marine insurance
law has similar nature in the context of obligation to disclose to the English marine
insurance law. Both apply the actual and constructive knowledge. However, French legal
formulation on that issue is basically different by stating that if the assured does not
possess the knowledge of the factual information, he can not know that this information
is material for the insurer. It applies particularly in the French hull and cargo conditions.
From here, there is no surprise if the nature of sanction in the French marine insurance
law is more flexible and varied than in the English marine insurance cas e. For example,
French Insurance Contract Act article L 172-2 seems to be most favourable with the full
protection for the assured who has no knowledge about the information, even if he ought
to have known. Accordingly, the insurer is entitled to reduce indemnity proportionally to
the premium paid if as a result of non-disclosure that he ought to know, the insurer would
have accepted the insurance, but on other conditions and terms. Also, it has been used if
the assured knew about the information , but thought it was insignificant (good faith).
That legal formulation was totally contrary to the English marine insurance system which
allows the insurer to claim avoiding the contract, even if the assured did not possess the
information.
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In Italy and Slovenia, the avoidance of a contract insurance is only given under the
ground of gross-negligence and reduction in liability or additional premium in ordinary
negligence. Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Japan and apparently Croatia, the insurer will
fully be liable for incurred casualties if there is breach of the duty of disclosure in good
faith (innocent breach) (Wilhemsen, 2000).

In the context of common law state, Australia, has stipulated the regime of flexibility in
the issue of utmost good faith duty application with section 13 of Insurance Contract Act
which provides that there is an implied term in a contract of general insurance requiring
each party to act towards the other party with utmost good faith. The legal consequence
of making the duty of good faith an implied term of the contract is said to be make a
broad range of contractual remedies available both insurer and insured for a breach of the
duty of utmost good faith (Derrington, 1996).

Therefore, an effort to make a flexible regime in the context of the application of utmost
good faith duty by Australia goes to the basic change of its legal formulation by
proposing the new legal concept of utmost good faith duty in the its marine insurance
law. This legal proposal of changing the utmost good faith regime in Australia had been
recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) from its report on the
Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909. The ALRC proposed several new legal
concept of the application of utmost good faith principle, inter alia, as follows :

1. MIA 1909 must be amended to provide that there is implied term in a contract of
marine insurance a provisions requiring each party to act towards the other party
with utmost good faith in the terms of ICA section 13 and 14.
2. MIA section 24 (1) and 26 (1) should be amended to provide that an insured must
disclose accurately all circumstances that it knows, or a reasonable person in its
position would know, to be material.
3. MIA 1909 should be amended to insert new provisions which provide that if the
insured has breached its duties relating to non-disclosure and misrepresentation :
(1) if the breach is fraudulent, the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy from its
outset with no return of premium;
(2) if the breach is not fraudulent :
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(a) where the insurer would not have entered into the contract if it had known
of the undisclosed circumstance or the truth of the misrepresented
circumstance, the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy from its outset but
with e return of premium.
(b) Where the insurer would have entered into the contract but on other
conditions, the insurer is not entitled to avoid the policy but : (i) is not
liable to indemnify the insured from a loss proximately caused by the
undisclosed or misrepresented circumstance; (ii) is entitled to vary its
liability to the insured to reflect the amount of any variation in premium,
deductible or excess that would have been imposed if it had known of the
undisclosed circumstance or the truth of the misrepresented circumstance;
and (iii) is entitled to cancel the policy in accordance with the other
provisions of the Marine Insurance Act on cancellation which are subject
of recommendation 18.
IV.5. The Promising Change of the Utmost Good Faith Duty
From the perspective of the insurer, the remedy of damages has been opened to be used
by the insurer in the case of a negligent misrepresentation to the insurer by the assured in
a marine insurance contract, as mentioned in section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act
1967. However, in the author´s view, to use this alternative remedy independently has
gained less attention. So that it is more reasonable if this damages will be claim in lieu of
the avoidance of a contract.

Nevertheless, the promising change of the harshness and disproportionate regime in the
context of utmost good faith duty under the English marine insurance law could be seen
from the decision of the House of Lords in the case of HIH Casualty and General
Insurance Ltd and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others (2003). In that case,
(which was analysed from different perspective in the previous chapter) describes the
assured who had no relevant knowledge of the subject-matters insured, financing the film
production, placed the risk through his brokers to the insurer. As a matter of having no
relevant knowledge and experience in the context of effecting marine insurance, the
assured through the broker, asserted the truth of statement into the contract of insurance
in order to regulate the duty of utmost good faith owed by the assured and his agents,
insurance broker, by the virtue of section 17 – 20 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The
main purposes of that truth of statement clause is to protect the assured from the extreme
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rules applied in the context of utmost good faith principle under the English insurance
regime. The clause of a statement truth had regulated, inter alia, as follows :

(6) the insured will not have any duty or obligation to make any representation,
warranty or disclosure of any nature, express or implied (such duty and obligation
being expressly waived by the insurers), and;
(7) shall have no liability of any nature to the insurers for any information provided
by any other parties;
(8) any such information provided by or non-disclosure by other parties…..shall not
be a ground or grounds for avoidance of the insurer´s obligations under the
insurance policy or cancellation thereof.

The assured made claims under the policy amounting to USD 16,5 million, in which the
insurers contended by claiming back to avoid the insurance policy based on the grounds
of fraudulent as well as negligent misrepresentation and non-disclosure made by his
broker. In addition, the insurers also claimed damages to the assured as well as the
broker. In his response, the assured denied to the insurer that he could activate the
remedy of avoidance or damages based on the application of the truth statement in the
insurance policy agreed by both contracting parties, even if the allegation made by the
insurer was true.

It was held by the House of Lords that : (1) the clause (6) concerned about the exclusion
of the assured´s obligations to observe the pre-contractual utmost good faith duty.
Therefore, the assured does need to make representation as well as duty to disclose
regarding the risks insured, such duties being expressly waived by the insurer. However,
the claim that this clause was capable of relieving the broker´s duty to disclose was
rejected; (2) the clause (7) precludes the right of the insurer to avoid the contract based on
the ground of innocent as well as negligent misrepresentation made by the broker. It also
precludes the liability of the assured to be claimed in damages under section of 2(1) of
the Misrepresentation Act 1967 for any negligent misrepresentation of the broker; (3)
clause (8) operates similar to clause (7) above as long as the non-disclosure concerned.
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This clause precludes the insurer´s right to avoid contract based on the innocent and
negligent non-disclosure made by the broker; (4) However, even the truth statement
clause was capable to exclude the consequences of any misrepresentation as well as nondisclosure, regardless of their types, the Lords believed that the wording of the truth
statement clause was not sufficient enough to exclude the possibility of avoiding the
policy by the insurer due to the fraudulent misrepresentation and non-disclosure.
Nevertheless, there was dissenting judgment from Scott LJ by stating that the wording of
the truth statement clause is capable enough to cover the fraudulent misrepresentation and
non-disclosure made by the broker.

According to the legal comments in the Journal of International Maritime Law (2003) the
judgement of the House of Lords in the case of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd
and Others v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others has given the legal basis that the
English court would adopt in interpreting clauses which attempt to limit or exclude the
duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts. The facts that the assured had less
relevant knowledge with regard of subject-matters insured, film production business, and
the existence of a genuine need to protect his interest against niceties of insurance law.
From the legal perspective of the House of Lords, the clause agreed amicably by the
contracting parties to exclude the application utmost good faith duty when concluding
insurance contract should not be prevented or prohibited under the reasons of public
policy or rule of law. Even if there is no reason for public policy this is why he should not
be able to exclude his contractual liability for fraudulent non-disclosure or
misrepresentation by his agent, unless such agent or broker of the assured knew of, or
was otherwise complicit in, the fraud or when the agent was the alter ego of the principal.

Accordingly, the judgement above is good news for the assured who was struggling to
find a solution to protect himself from the unfair legal regime under the English law in
the context of utmost good faith principle. The contractual approach should include
similar the truth statement clause as cited from such case constitutes, at present, the best
practical solution legally that the assured may obtain in order to get proper legal
protection of his interest in the marine insurance cover. That case also could be a legal
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guidance to formulate better wording in the term of exclusion clauses covering the issue
of duty of disclosure and misrepresentation, regardless of their types. The adoption of
exclusion clause to preclude the utmost good faith duty by the House of Lords has
become the recent position of the English marine insurance law in the context of utmost
good faith principle.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The existence of the utmost good faith principle under the English marine insurance law
has been crystallizing the unique position of this principle in its application to the marine
insurance business globally. The uniqueness of this principle was derived from the
specific application and its different legal approach that it had been taken by the English
jurisdiction when dealing with the legal disputes of marine insurance contract under
utmost good faith issues. The legal approach uniquely taken by the English jurisdiction
has been formulated through the interpretation of section 17-20 of MIA 1906 and applied
it to the several prominent legal cases upon which the established legal formula, in the
context of utmost good faith principle, upheld precisely. This uniqueness tends largely to
be more focused on the protection of the insurer´s interests, than making the duty balance
between the assured and the insurer.

V.1. English Legal Position of Utmost Good Faith Principle
The acknowledgement of a unbalance obligations in the utmost good faith duty has been
proved firstly by the legal issue of balanced duty of utmost good faith in the marine
insurance contract. It was not recognized under the English marine insurance law by the
judgement of Banque Financiere de la Cite SA v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. (1990)
which concluded that no duty of disclosure for the insurer to inform the discovered fraud
conducted by the assured´s broker.

The draconian remedy of avoidance has become the only legal choice that the English
can provide, which is proved by the Litsion Pride(1985). There was no right to claim
damages as stipulated in the case of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd and Others
v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Others. (2001). This very extreme remedy was definitely
connected with the regime of no gravity of fault in the context of utmost good faith
breach. In other words, there is no difference the breach was committed fraudulently,
negligently or innocently, all breaches would give the right of the insurer to claim an
avoidance of contract.
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Truth was not a necessary concept in the context of duty to disclose; the material
information is not true such as the material rumours upon which its nature of truth not to
be known yet may give the insurer to avoid contract. The case of Elena (2001) and
Inversiones Manria S.A. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co.Plc., Malvern Insurance Co.Ltd.,
and Niagara Fire Insurance Co.Inc., (1989) have proven the legal formulation of the
truth of any material information that must be disclosed under the English marine
insurance law. However, under the legal basis of truth of the material information, if the
assured can prove that such material rumours is not true, he may use it as the legal
protection to reject the claim of the insurer to avoid the contract on the ground of material
rumours non-disclosure as decided firmly in the case of Gracia Express (2002). In
addition, the new regime of truth in the material rumours disclosure might not guarantee
the assured to be judged under the legal formulation of Elena and Inversiones cases,
owing to the doctrine of precedent law in the common law system which described that
the court should not have to follow precisely the court decision which had been decided
previously. So then the possibility of the assured being judged for the case of material
rumours non-disclosure is still relatively open.

Knowledge of the assured as well as the broker exists under the basis of the actual and
constructive knowledge. It means that the presumption of knowledge which could be
seen from the words “ ought to be known in the course of ordinary business”, may
impose the breach of duty if it is failed to disclose. Therefore, when it is connected to the
regime of materiality and inducement, the question of non-disclosure, for actual and
constructive knowledge, will be measured from the prudent insurer approach. Thus, such
non-disclosure, as applied to the law of misrepresentation, has to be proven as to whether
having induced the insurer or not. A test of inducement shall be determined as a nondecisive one. This explained that the inducement approach also to be operative in the
duty of disclosure. The cases of CTI and Pan Atlantic have supported such legal
formulation applicable in the English marine insurance law.
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Another thing that is very interesting is the application of utmost good faith in the precontractual stage as well as post-contractual period. The post-contract issue would give
the opportunity to the insurer to avoid liability on the grounds which do not connect to
the occurrence of the loss. The fraudulent conducts is the only legal basis that may
activate the breach of post-contract duty of the utmost good faith. As it can be proved
from the cases of the Litsion Pride, Star Sea, Mercandian Continent and Aegeon.
However, the insurer must show that the fraudulent conducts must be material and induce
prejudicially to the ultimate liability of the insurer.

The brief description with regard to the existing law and practice to the application of
utmost good faith duty in the context of the English marine insurance regime shows the
legal situation which has been disproportionate and unfair from the point of view of the
mutual obligation to the insurer and the assured to observe the good faith issues.
Particularly, when it compares to the other legal regimes established by several leading
marine insurance markets in the European states and Australia.

V.2. Different Approaches
Several European countries, mainly from the civil law system, had adopted a different
approach as taken by the English jurisdiction. Countries like Norway, Italy, Germany,
France, Slovenia, and Croatia much prefer to establish a balance duty of utmost good
faith by stipulating the flexibility in terms of remedy to the breach of such duty based on
the gravity of fault. And they provide a fair legal formulation in the issue of materiality
test as well as the limit of knowledge that should be disclose to the insurer. That fair
regime of the application of utmost good faith duty also has been followed by one
common law state, Australia, by applying broad choices of remedies in the context of the
application of utmost good faith in a insurance contract under the ICA. Then it revises its
marine insurance law turning to the position much in favour of the protection of the
assured´s interests. The force to take a harmonised marine policy among the states, has
been accelerating through the commitment made in the European Community. In
addition, an international action taken by the Comite Maritime International to persuade
the harmonisation of certain issues of the marine insurance among jurisdictions, can be a
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good step to persuade the English marine insurance community in order to reconsider of
change the section 17.20 of the MIA 1906.

V.3. A New Legal Position
In the absence of any change to the section 17-20 of the MIA, the assured may achieve
the benefits of the recent legal position taken by the English court. By which, it allows to
limit or exclude the duty of utmost good faith by applying an specific clause in the
insurance policy. At least, for those, the assureds, who want to effect the insurance cover
under the English law, may obtain a better legal protection of harshness and
disproportionate of the application of utmost good faith duty including its draconian
remedy of avoidance the contract under the basis of contractual approach by inserting a
similar clause of the truth statement. It would become a high relief to create a balance
position and legal solution for the assured to have certainty in his insurance cover.

V.4. Legal Recommendations
1. It is highly desirable to revise the legal conceptualisation of the section 17-20 of
Marine Insurance Act 1906. The subject-matters are recommended to be revised
namely; the notion of no gravity of faults in its application, the extreme remedy of
avoidance of the contract, the prudent insurer test, conceptualisation of the assured´s
knowledge, and actual inducement of non-disclosure.

2. If the assured has an intention to effect an insurance cover, particularly marine
insurance policy, and does not want to be involved with the intrigues of the English
marine insurance law, upon which his cover may be abolished drastically as a result
of breach of the utmost good faith duty, he may choose other kind of policy under the
jurisdiction of different states in other insurance markets such as :
a. Norway
b. France.
c. Germany.
d. Australia.
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The legal reason for that choices of using other types of jurisdiction when one
effecting insurance cover is caused by the legal regime applied to those types of
jurisdiction above simply is generally fairer and proportionate in terms of imposing
the duty of utmost good faith in the insurance policy and provides a broad range of
remedies based on the gravity of the fault. Hence an assured, which is afraid of losing
the insurance cover as a result of breach, innocently or mere negligently, of the
utmost good faith duty, will get better legal treatment which much more tends to
protect the assured´s interests and keep a balance to observe the obligation of utmost
good faith between the assured and the insurer.

3. If one wants to effect the insurance cover under the context of the English marine
insurance law, that person should be legally aware or careful of the legal effects of
the utmost good faith duty imposed on the shoulder of an assured or his broker. It is
because the effect of such duty, when breaching it regardless the gravity of fault,
leaves the assured without his insurance cover.

So in order to solve this legal

problem, under the regime of the freedom of contract, one should assert the specific
clauses in an insurance contract which generally regulates the exclusion of utmost
good faith duty stipulated in the section 17-20 of Marine Insurance Act 1906. In
specific, such exclusion clauses would cover the legal issues of :
a. An exclusion of the obligations to perform the duty of utmost good faith,
particularly when the assured has no relevant knowledge to the subject-matters
insured;
b. Limit the scope of the insurer´s right to avoid the contract only based on the
grounds of fraudulent breach of utmost good faith duty.
c. An exclusion not to observe the utmost good faith duty is applicable to the
assured as well as the broker.
d. It should be ensured that the wording of the exclusion clauses regulate firmly the
legal formulation stipulated I item a, b, and c in order to give the strong evidence
to the court regarding the exclusion of utmost good faith precisely as mentioned
in the MIA 1906 (when it is necessary).
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